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ABSTRACT

RE-IMAGINING ARTS-CENTERED INQUIRY
AS PRAGMATIC INSTRUMENTALISM
by
Leann F. Logsdon
Arts education must continually provide justification for its inclusion in the K-12
curriculum. This dissertation utilizes philosophical and conceptual analysis to probe the
tensions, ironies, and contradictions that permeate the arts education advocacy discourse.
Using evidence from advocacy materials published online, scholarly critiques of themes
in the advocacy discourse, and research reports describing school-based arts programs, I
construct an argument that posits generative consequences for student learning when artscentered inquiry is reimagined as pragmatic instrumentalism. Such a reimagining of artscentered inquiry seeks to draw a distinction between utilitarian justifications for the arts
and instrumental benefits the arts provide individual students in mediating complex and
connected learning. In reclaiming the term “instrumental” for arts-centered inquiry, I
offer a way to restore the notion of generativity to arts learning and a means to promote
greater understanding among practitioners, researchers, policymakers, and advocates.
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1
CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM OF ADVOCATING FOR ARTS EDUCATION
Arts education advocates have argued for years that the arts deserve a place in the
public school curriculum alongside other disciplines. Providing philosophical grounding
for arts education poses a complex array of challenges, however, since the conceptual
analysis of arts-centered inquiry requires the use of language to probe underlying
assumptions and reconstruct ideas for future consideration, a process arguably at odds
with the sensory immediacy of the arts domains in which aesthetic inquiry proceeds.1
Moreover, rationales offered by arts advocates in an effort to convince policymakers and
arts educators of the positive role the arts can play in achieving societal goals not only
lack empirical support but represent a dualistic conceptualization inadequate to the task
of understanding how students make meaning when engaged in arts-centered inquiry.
Positioned toward one end of the arts advocacy spectrum are those who make the
case that given today’s high-stakes testing environment, integrating the arts across the
curriculum provides a useful and appealing argument for arts learning in K-12 schools.
The arts integration advocacy stance emphasizes an array of instrumental benefits
afforded students that contribute to enhanced learning outcomes in state-assessed content
areas. Some educational scholars, however, worry that increased efforts to integrate the
arts will further weaken school-based arts programs. They argue instead that a

1

Nel Noddings notes that many educational philosophers engage in conceptual
analysis to probe the connections between the use of language and practice. See Nel
Noddings, Philosophy of Education, 2nd ed. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2007), 44.

2
comprehensive, sequential arts program taught by certified arts specialists offers students
educational benefits not attainable anywhere else in the curriculum.2
Recent arts-based school reform initiatives have sought ways to resolve tensions
between the arts-centered and integrated approaches to thinking about the role of arts
education in schools.3 In assessing the sustainability of the A+ Schools Program, for
example, the program evaluators note that taking a both/and approach to competing
conceptualizations of arts education sets A+ apart from other reform efforts. Noblit, et al.
conclude that “the arts and arts integration simply make classrooms and schools more
desirable places to be.”4 Yet there is a tacit presupposition within the phrase “the arts and
arts integration” that a distinction persists between how the arts are viewed and valued in
schools. This dissertation adopts a pragmatic instrumentalist stance to demonstrate the
incongruity of drawing a distinction between “pure” stand-alone arts experiences and
“practical” classroom arts activities tied to content from other subjects since, as I will
argue, the desired educational consequence of arts-centered inquiry is connected,
generative learning. In short, like John Dewey, I want students to construct meanings
instrumental to subsequent inquiries.5 In adopting Dewey’s pragmatic view that
2

See, for example, Bennett Reimer, “Facing the Risks of the ‘Mozart Effect’,”
Music Educators Journal 86, no. 1 (July 1999): 37-43; and Elliot Eisner, “Does
Experience in the Arts Boost Academic Achievement?” Art Education 51, no. 1 (January
1998): 7-15.
3

See George W. Noblit et al., Creating and Sustaining Arts-Based School
Reform: The A+ Schools Program (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group,
2009), 25.
4

5

Ibid., 1.

John Dewey, Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Education (New York: The Free Press, 1916), 76.

3
“knowing is not self-enclosed and final but is instrumental to reconstruction of
situations,”6 I provide evidence from selected examples of advocacy materials published
online, scholarly critiques of arts advocacy claims, and program evaluations of schoolbased arts programs to support an expanded conceptualization of arts-centered inquiry as
pragmatic instrumentalism. Reimagining arts-centered inquiry in this way entails
reclaiming the concept instrumental for the arts and reawakening in schools what Dewey
describes as the “imaginative vision [that] elicits the possibilities that are interwoven
within the texture of the actual.”7

What Taking a Pragmatic Approach to Arts-Centered Inquiry Means
In the essay, “What Pragmatism Means,” William James argues that pragmatism
shares features with other philosophies. For example, pragmatism appeals to particulars
like nominalism, emphasizes the practical like utilitarianism, and avoids metaphysical
abstractions like positivism.8 In contrast to Idealists, whose Truth-claims are grounded in
a priori principles, James posits that to the extent that ideas work to securely and
satisfactorily carry us from one part of our experience to another, they become “true for
just so much, true in so far forth, true instrumentally.”9 For James, the question
Pragmatism asks is whether, in granting an idea or belief to be true, its being true makes
6

John Dewey, Reconstruction in Philosophy (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications,
1920/2004), 84.
7

John Dewey, Art as Experience (New York: Perigee, 1934/2005), 359-360.

8

William James, “What Pragmatism Means,” in Pragmatism: A New Name for
Some Old Ways of Thinking, eds. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1907/1975), 32.
9

Ibid., 34. Italics in original.
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any concrete difference in one’s life.10 Referring to objects of inquiry, James writes: “The
practical value of true ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of
their objects to us.”11
In a pragmatist approach to inquiry, which I define as conscious effort directed
toward the solution of a problem, inquirers generate ideas in ways that take into
consideration a range of consequences should the means connected to those
consequences be enacted. Charles S. Peirce frames the process as follows: “Consider
what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings you conceive the objects of
your conception to have. Then, your conception of those effects is the whole of your
conception of the object.”12 Dewey clarifies the pragmatist approach to conceptualization
when he describes ideas as “intellectual instruments to be tested and confirmed – and
altered – through consequences effected by acting upon them.”13
To lend further support to the pragmatist approach to knowing, Dewey
underscores the illogic of separating means from ends with examples from the arts:
It is as if one professed devotion to painting pictures conjoined with
contempt for canvas, brush and paints; or love of music on condition that
no instruments, whether the voice or something external, be used to make
sounds. The good workman in the arts is known by his respect for his tools
and by his interest in perfecting his technique. The glorification in the arts
10

William James, “Pragmatism’s Conception of Truth,” in Pragmatism: A New
Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, eds. Fredson Bowers and Ignas K. Skrupskelis
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1907/1975), 97.
11

Ibid., 98.

12

Charles S. Peirce, “Issues of Pragmatism,” excerpted in The American
Pragmatists, eds. Milton R. Konvitz and Gail Kennedy (New York: Meridian Books,
1960), 119. Italics in original.
13

John Dewey, The Quest for Certainty (Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1929/1988), 221.

5
of ends at the expense of means would be taken to be a sign of complete
insincerity or even insanity. Ends separated from means are either sentimental indulgences or if they happen to exist are merely accidental. The
ineffectiveness in action of “ideals” is due precisely to the supposition that
means and ends are not on exactly the same level with respect to the
attention and care they demand.14
Dewey concludes the section by stating: “For there is no art without tools and instrumenttal agencies.”15 Dewey’s conceptualization of artistic production as pragmatic instrumenttalism provides the philosophical grounding for my argument that in order for artscentered inquiry in schools to make a positive difference in students’ lives, the conceptual
divide between creativity and instrumentality must be interrogated and pragmatic
consequences for arts education reimagined.

Historical Antecedents to Dualistic Approaches to the Arts
Dewey attributes the persistence of dualisms within Western thinking to the fact
that the Greek society of Plato and Aristotle was sharply divided into the servile and
leisure classes. The latter was associated with contemplation, intelligence, and finality,
while the former concerned itself with practical matters of instrumentality.16 Dewey
exposes what he called “the ingratitude displayed by [classic Greek] thinkers to artists.”17
In the classical scheme, any object considered to be a means was inherently defective and
menial precisely because the object’s transitory nature and transformational potential
14

Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 223.

15

Ibid.

16

John Dewey, Experience and Nature, 2nd ed. (New York: Dover Publications,
1929/1958), 93. Here, the term instrumentality denotes utility in exerting control over
nature and facilitating communal life.
17

Ibid., 124.
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indicated that it lacked fullness of Being. As Dewey explains, the division in Greek
society between the laboring and leisure class became a metaphysical division into things
which are mere means and things which are ends. This classical conceptualization has
epistemic implications since, as Dewey notes, it means that the former class of objects
“can never be known in themselves but only in their subordination to objects that are
final, while the latter can be known in and through themselves by self-enclosed reason.”18
Dewey argues that this narrow view of instrumentalism protected classical Greek
philosophy from facing the possibility that the stable outcomes the thinkers and rulers
sought were tied to the intelligent agency of those members of their society most attuned
to the workings of nature: the farmers, fisherman, navigators, carpenters, metalworkers,
weavers, tanners, healers, and warriors. Safeguarding the social order, however, came at
the expense of introducing what Dewey describes as “a split in Being itself” as reflected
in other metaphysical dualisms that persist today, including mind/matter, rational/
sensuous, and universal/particular.19 This inquiry is my affirmative response to Dewey’s
challenge to question taken-for-granted dualisms. In laying out my argument, I seek to
“balance the credit items” gained as a result of my having inherited the tools of logic and
discursive thought from the Greeks against what have been for the arts “debit
consequences resulting from the hard and fast separation of the instrumental and final.”20
My academic training and cultural perspective are decidedly Western. Nevertheless, my

18

Dewey, Experience and Nature, 124.

19

Ibid.

20

Ibid., 125-126.
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work to expand the concept of instrumentalism represents my commitment to generative
arts learning, a stance that advocates for student inquiry of limitless possibilities.

Dewey’s Naturalistic Approach to Inquiry
According to Craig Cunningham, Dewey’s reconstruction of the Greek notion that
thought was real and observed facts only appearances hinges on how Dewey defines
“object.” Rather than flipping the attribution of what constitutes the real and its
approximation as the empiricists did, Dewey instead develops a naturalistic view in
which what is there is experienced as a whole in its immediacy. Objects emerge as
objects of inquiry, that is, in connection with other perceptions or ideas.21
Dewey’s naturalistic approach to inquiry also differs from the two-phase
description of experience offered by Immanuel Kant in The Critique of the Power of
Judgment.22 Dewey criticizes the Kantian notion that sense material, entering from the
outside, connects with thought, supplied from within, in a covert synthesis.23 Instead,
Dewey argues that in the experimental approach to knowing, perception furnishes the
problems for knowing, and its status in inquiry, although tentative, is complementary to
conception in directed action toward an “intelligible conclusion.”24

21

Craig A. Cunningham, “Dewey’s Metaphysics and the Self,” Studies in
Philosophy and Education 13 (1994/95): 344-346.
22

See Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans.
Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
1790/2000).
23

Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, 136-137.

24

Ibid., 143-144.

8
In reconstructing the notion of instrumentality, Dewey regards a tool both as a
particular thing and also something more, for it embodies a relation connecting ends-inview to means. Dewey writes: “The spear suggests the feast not directly but through the
medium of other external things, such as the game and the hunt, to which the sight of the
weapon transports imagination. … A tool denotes a perception and acknowledgment of
sequential bonds in nature.”25 Thus, Dewey expands the concept of instrumental to help
describe what happens in inquiry. Nature presents transitory events, the possible
consequences of which are apprehended by the individuals experiencing the events and
formulating connections with other perceptions in the process of making meaning.
“When things are defined as instruments,” Dewey explains, “their value and validity
reside in what proceeds from them; consequences not antecedents supply meaning and
verity.”26 Eventualities suggest further possibilities for directed action toward the
fulfillment of desires. With each successive inquiry, the interdependent operations linking
“This-is-true-if” hypothesizing with “Making-sure” testing recur.27 In short, on the
Deweyan or Pragmatic Instrumentalist view, the word “knowledge” means events
understood.28

25

Dewey, Experience and Nature, 123.

26

Ibid., 154.

27

Ibid., 154-155. See also pp. 158-159 where Dewey emphasizes that the idealist
paradigm “mistranslated” the constructively instrumental work of thought (intelligence,
reason) as a noun rather than as an adjective or adverb. “It is disposition of activity, a
quality of that conduct which foresees consequences of existing events, and which uses
what is foreseen as a plan and method of administering affairs.”
28

Ibid., 161.
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Dewey’s work to reconstruct the concept of instrumentality reflects his time and
place. Noting the industrial accomplishments and scientific achievements of his day,
Dewey nevertheless considers both to be inadequate in addressing the challenges
confronting the world. He writes:
What is the matter? It lies, I think, with our lack of imagination in generating
leading ideas. Because we are afraid of speculative ideas, we do, and do over
and over again, an immense amount of dead, specialized work in the region
of “facts.” We forget that such facts are only data; that is, are only fragmentary,
uncompleted meanings, and unless they are rounded out into complete ideas –
a work which can only be done by hypotheses, by a free imagination of
intellectual possibilities – they are as helpless as are all maimed things and as
repellent as are needlessly thwarted ones.29
Dewey clearly is calling for a renewed commitment to the constructively instrumental
work of producing imaginative and generative ideas to meet social needs. Paul Oskar
Kristeller argues that the modern system of what we commonly refer to as “The Arts”
evolved in Western Europe precisely in response to social needs; the arts were variously
grouped according to the particular intellectual, moral, religious, and practical functions
each art form contributed to society.30 The following section will trace the fluidity with
which the arts were conceptualized in Western philosophical discourse.

29

John Dewey, Philosophy and Civilization (New York: Minton, Balch, 1931),
excerpted in The American Pragmatists, eds. Milton R. Konvitz and Gail Kennedy (New
York: Meridian Books, 1960), 182.
30

Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History
of Aesthetics (I),” Journal of the History of Ideas 12, no. 4 (October, 1951): 496-527. A
second part was published in the same journal in volume 13, no. 1 (January, 1952): 1746.

10
Fluid Conceptualizations of the Arts Viewed in Historical Context
Kristeller formulated his argument for the evolving ways the arts were
conceptualized and grouped based on evidence in Western philosophical writing from
Hippocrates, Plato, and Aristotle to John Dewey. In ancient Greece, for example, music
was paired with mathematics to reflect the deep structural connections Pythagoras
discovered in the numerical proportions associated with musical intervals. Poetry was
associated with religious prophecy in its function as a form of divine madness, while
painting and sculpture were categorized as manual arts and therefore relegated to the
lower echelon in the duality separating ends from means. In conceptualizing the arts in
terms of function, classical Greek thought nevertheless made a distinction between
knowledge and skills still evident in educational standards that state what students should
know and be able to do. Kristeller concludes: “Plato puts art above mere routine because
it proceeds by rational principles and rules, and Aristotle, who lists Art among the socalled intellectual virtues, characterizes it as a kind of activity based on knowledge, in a
definition whose influence was felt through many centuries.”31 The ancient Greeks
always understood Art as something that could be taught and learned; an important
question is whether current narrow conceptualizations of arts-centered inquiry threaten to
limit students’ potential for creative growth in all areas of their lives.
A major shift in how the arts were conceptualized took place throughout the
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to Kristeller, as the
acceleration of scientific discoveries solidified the philosophical notion of human
progress, academies of science developed apart from academies of the fine arts. It was
31

Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts (I),” 499.

11
this divide between science and art that shaped the modern Western conceptualization of
“the Fine Arts.” As Kristeller’s textual analysis shows, the arts disciplines, “where
everything depends on talent and taste,” were characterized in the treatises he examined
as less able to assert their contribution to the idea of human progress with the same
confidence as the sciences, which depend on measurement.32 Interestingly, the discourse
begun three centuries ago continues today as amenity to curriculum-based measurement
serves as the criterion for determining the relative value of what is taught in school.
Had the separation between the arts and sciences persisted unchanged, arts
educators might not be facing the challenge of having to continually advocate on behalf
of the arts for inclusion in the school curriculum, since both divisions of intellectual
inquiry contribute to maintaining functioning societies. What muddied the waters
conceptually was the appearance in 1714 of a discussion of Beauty by J. P. de Crousaz in
a work considered to be the earliest French treatise on aesthetics.33 For some time, the
exchange of ideas across the European continent concerning commonalities among the
various arts disciplines had flowed largely from the pens of amateur writers sharing ideas
about the aesthetic judgment of beauty. Kristeller posits that the rise of the amateur
public accounts for the tendency to group together the spectator activities of collecting
and exhibiting art, attending concerts and theatre performances, and writing literary
criticism. He further notes that this approach to the fine arts may also explain why until

32

33

Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts (I),” 526-527.

Paul Oskar Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History
of Aesthetics (II),” Journal of the History of Ideas 13, no. 1 (January, 1952): 17-46, 17.
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recently, aesthetics has been theorized from the point of view of the percipient rather than
the artist.34
To further complicate matters, around the same period the German philosopher
Alexander Baumgarten defined aesthetics as the theory of sensuous knowledge and
conceptualized it as the epistemological counterpart to logic, a branch of philosophy that
provides a theory of intellectual knowledge. It is Baumgarten whose name is most closely
associated with “aesthetics” as a separate field of inquiry and whose work laid the
foundation for our modern conception of the “fine arts.”35 His legacy persists in the ways
the arts are perceived as separate from academics despite their designation as core
academic subjects in current federal law.36
George Dickie argues that Baumgarten’s ideas had little direct influence on the
subsequent turn in philosophy which took place during the second half of the eighteenthcentury, a move away from focusing exclusively on theories of beauty and toward the
development of theories of taste.37 The philosophical shift had more to do with the larger

34

Kristeller, “The Modern System of the Arts: A Study in the History of
Aesthetics (II),” 44.
35

Ibid., 33-35.

36

U.S. Public Law 107-110, No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, U.S. Department
of Education Homepage, http://www.ed.gov/ (accessed January 3, 2011). Title IX, Sec.
9101, Stat. 1958 reads: “The term ‘core academic subjects’ means English, reading or
language arts, mathematics, science, foreign languages, civics and government,
economics, arts, history, and geography.” The entire law may be downloaded by linking
to http://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/ sea02/107-110.pdf.
37

George Dickie, Introduction to Aesthetics: An Analytic Approach (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1997), 9-10. This book is a revision of Aesthetics: An
Introduction, which Dickie published in 1971. The author notes on page ix of the Preface:
“The material on eighteenth-century theories of taste in this history has been extensively
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discourse engaging thinkers across Europe beginning in the seventeenth-century, a period
in Western thought now referred to as “The Enlightenment.” As Dickie explains, the
movement in aesthetics toward taste reflected both rationalist and empiricist approaches
to inquiry. Attention turned to the human subject, who, upon encountering works of art or
natural phenomena, would enter into distinct states of mind that could be categorized
rationally and associated empirically with qualities in the external objects that caused
these states. A person could then judge with confidence whether an object was beautiful,
picturesque, novel, sublime, and so forth. Edmund Burke’s philosophical inquiry
published in 1759 exemplifies the complexity of this effort, in which “faculties of the
mind” of the subject are assumed to perceive objects “in all men the same,” but the
subcategories of sensuous qualities making up the perceived objects number in the
dozens.38 Still, Burke is able to construct a useful dualism, judging objects that engender
pleasure to be beautiful and those causing pain or terror to be a source of the sublime.
Taste, then, is a concept, and according to Burke, it is comprised of sensibility and
judgment. Logically, therefore, taste can be improved “exactly as we improve our
judgment, by extending our knowledge, by a steady attention to our object, and by
frequent exercise.”39
The foundational belief that taste can be cultivated enters the philosophical
discourse as the role of the arts in U.S. public schools is articulated in the nineteenth

rewritten to bring it into accord with my 1996 book, The Century of Taste: The
Philosophical Odyssey of Taste in the Eighteenth Century.”
38

Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the
Sublime and Beautiful, 2nd ed. (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 1759/2008), 3.
39

Ibid., 15.

14
century. Even during the colonial period, the Western notion of rational human subjects
forming mutually beneficial associations offers historical context for the view that
education in the arts serves societal needs. My conceptual analysis of various
justifications for art and music education found in historical documents from the earliest
days of the republic follows interpretations offered by J. Scott Goble, whose pragmatist
orientation aligns with the theoretical framework of this dissertation.40 The historical
evidence presented in the next section supports my argument that since colonial days, the
cultivation of taste and the promotion of a democratic and capitalist society both emerge
as interwoven rationales for school-based arts instruction.
The use of the word “rationale” is problematic, however, since the word connotes
providing an ad hoc explanation for phenomena rather than offering possibilities for
understanding the consequences of choices. In order to better understand consequences
for students given current opportunities for arts-centered inquiry, I turn to Cleo
Cherryholmes, who writes: “Tracing consequences can be thought of as the present
looking forward. And the present itself is a construction of past experiments. A history of
the present, therefore, is contextually important in imagining outcomes.”41 At the same
time, Cherryholmes cautions that “power, aesthetics, and knowledge, not necessarily in
this or any stable order or set of interactions, produce anticipations of consequences that
we continually re-write and re-evaluate.”42 So in order to, as Peirce advises, “consider
40
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what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings” on students’ learning in the
arts were a pragmatic instrumentalist view to be adopted,43 I will pragmatically examine
past experiments in arts education in the United States.

Early Rationales for Music and Art Education in the United States
Music education in seventeenth-century North America centered on teaching
musical skills necessary for worship. For Roman Catholic communities, this meant
training priests in how to intone chants and choirs in how to sing polyphonic parts of the
Mass. Similarly, Lutheran communities developed formal and informal means of
preparing hymns for Sunday worship services.44
Goble notes that early versions of Puritan psalters, including the Bay Psalm Book
of 1640, contain references to tune names but include no musical notation.45 Despite the
inclusion of notation in later editions, historical writings from the colonial period
document the decline in singing quality among Puritan congregations. Beginning in
Boston in 1722 and continuing over the next fifty years, singing schools were established
in New England as well as in South Carolina, Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland, to
address the decline by providing colonists vocal instruction.
Vocal music was introduced as a regular school subject in Boston common
schools in 1838. According to Goble, the Boston School Board’s approval came as a
consequence of a friendship between William Channing Woodbridge and Lowell Mason.
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Woodbridge, an influential New England educator, had traveled to Europe in the 1820s,
where he was introduced to the ideas of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi. Mason, a children’s
vocal instructor in Boston, met Woodbridge after the latter’s return from Europe and in
the course of their association began to incorporate Pestalozzian ideas into his vocal
teaching practice.46
Mason spent several years soliciting public support through concerts and other
advocacy efforts before securing approval for publicly funded, school-based music
education.47 In the instructional manual Mason published in 1834, he offered a number of
justifications for school-based vocal music, among them improved physical health,
exercise and discipline for the mind, and training, cultivation, and elevation of the
feelings.
Art education in the early days of the Republic, like music education, was
grounded in the Enlightenment notion that “exposure to great works of art was expected
to improve intellect, behavior, and taste.”48 The arts advocacy discourse emerging
between 1790 and 1840 conceptualized art making as an intellectual project, but the
justification argument broadened to emphasize the connection between artistic
communication of human ideals and a democratically functioning social order. For
example, not only could the technical aspects of art making be taught to individuals with
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natural talent, but principles of art criticism could be taught to the wider population. The
presupposition was that as Americans improved their individual creative and critical
faculties, the nation as a whole would benefit.49
Given the high value that members of local communities placed on participation
in music and art experiences, one can conclude that the arts provided many localities with
structures to promote social cohesion. For example, the singing school tradition that had
been established in the eighteenth century to address the decline in singing in worship
services continued into the nineteenth century in the form of community-based singing
societies.50 These American cultural institutions, along with symphony orchestras and
conservatories, focused on performing European masterworks, evidence of their
philosophical grounding in both the Enlightenment conception of musical works as
objects of beauty and the increasingly important notion of the artistic genius.51 As Goble
notes, the formalist and expressive dimensions of the European music these groups chose
to perform embodied and affirmed the worldview of those who revered it.52
Similarly in the realm of visual art, the emergence of the middle class created a
demand for institutions that would offer technical training, particularly in drawing.53
According to Stankiewicz, Amburgy, and Bolin, more than 145 drawing books were
published in the United States in the three decades preceding the Civil War, but their
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chief purpose was directly connected to the utilitarian goal of advancing economic
prosperity through disciplined instruction in drawing.54 The Massachusetts legislature
permitted the inclusion of drawing in the public school curriculum in 1859,55 responding
to an advocacy discourse that emphasized the connection between drawing instruction
and the development of conceptual knowledge in geography and geometry.56 The idea of
transfer across subjects embedded in the Pestalozzian educational approach influenced
visual art education as it had vocal education, with object drawing viewed instrumentally
as a means to assisting students in formulating clearer ideas.
The philosophical justifications for the inclusion of visual art and music as core
subjects in public schools diverge somewhat during the second half of the nineteenth
century. While advocates for music education argued that teaching vocal arrangements of
works by prominent European composers elevated students’ artistic tastes toward an
ideal, the advocates who petitioned Massachusetts legislators in 1869 to devise a plan to
offer free instruction in drawing took a utilitarian approach to art education. Representing
business, political, educational, and religious interests, many signers of the petition
envisioned expanded training in mechanical and industrial drawing to be an effective way
to enhance a strong economic climate in the industrialized northeast.57 At first glance, it
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might appear that community leaders were acting pragmatically: They conceived
desirable economic consequences for the region and imagined the practical steps they
could take to produce the desired effect. However, to the extent that drawing instruction
was viewed as a means to an economic end, the policy philosophically shares more with
the “greater good” thesis espoused by utilitarianism than with pragmatism’s notion of an
individual’s considered inquiry into an array of potential life consequences.
Given the historical context for justifying the inclusion of the arts in the nation’s
public school curriculum, this dissertation probes the tensions, ironies, and contradictions
that continue to permeate the arts education advocacy discourse. Using evidence from
advocacy materials published online, scholarly critiques of themes in the advocacy
discourse, and research reports describing exemplary school-based arts programs, I
construct an argument that posits positive consequences for student learning when artscentered inquiry is reimagined as pragmatic instrumentalism.
My argument is propelled by the critical need to interrogate various usages of the
term “instrumental” in the context of arts education. I draw a distinction between the
syntactical use of the term “instrumental” in denoting a structural, utilitarian function and
its meaning in the pragmatic sense of describing a medium for growth and generativity.
The difference has to do with the center of power. Structural instrumentality has as its
intended outcome efficient management of human behavior. By contrast, pragmatic
instrumentalism looks at transformative consequences for particular individuals engaged
in practical, everyday transactions. In reclaiming the term “instrumental” for artscentered inquiry, I offer a way to restore the notion of generativity to arts learning.

20
My argument employs conceptual analysis within a pragmatist framework. By
inquiring into arts education advocacy claims and arts-based research in schools using a
Deweyan approach, I am able to propose enriched possibilities for student learning when
arts-centered inquiry is reimagined as pragmatic instrumentalism. My purpose is neither
to argue the merits of arts education nor to deconstruct various philosophies of arts
education but rather to offer another approach to instrumentalism more in keeping with
the unpredictable and improvisational way arts-centered inquiry proceeds. I engage in the
inquiry bearing in mind Dewey’s words: “‘The only truly general thought is the generous
thought.’”58 It is my hope that this thesis will generate fruitful discussion about the value
of the arts in expanding the educational horizons of students and in deepening their
capacities for human connection.
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CHAPTER 2
THE ADVOCACY DISCOURSE IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
For more than a decade, scholars in the field of arts education have probed the
complex relationships among research, policy, and advocacy in formulating arguments to
justify the value of the arts in the K-12 curriculum. This chapter examines the pertinent
research literature from a pragmatist perspective, employing conceptual analysis to
critique major arguments in light of consequences for student learning. In taking a
Deweyan approach to philosophical inquiry, I view means and ends as inseparable;
however, to retrace consequences of educational policy decisions made over the course of
decades is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, the discussion will center on
recent antecedents to philosophical tensions, ironies, and contradictions embedded within
the current arts education advocacy discourse. The next section provides historical
context for the current debate over instrumental outcomes associated with arts education.

Twentieth Century Justifications for Arts Education
At the beginning of the twentieth century, music educators added the education of
feelings to the elevation of taste as a justification for offering music in schools.59
According to textual evidence gathered by Goble, music textbook editors took a
systematic and structural approach to song selection, choosing songs that would stimulate
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universal feelings of continuity, balance, proportion, and coherence.60 Terms describing
formal properties of music were characterized as effects connected to feeling. It was
generally believed that students would first respond to a song’s organic structure in its
perceived or “felt” immediacy; presumably the instructor would then guide the students
in musical inquiry in order to understand through conceptual analysis how the song’s
structural elements produced the felt effects of unity, balance, and proportion. This twostage process connecting individual sensory or felt perception to concepts believed to be
universal recalls theoretical constructs proposed by Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth
century. In his Critique of the Power of Judgment, Kant argues that the power of aesthetic
judgment “makes possible the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to that
of the concept of freedom.”61 As H. Gene Blocker explains, Kant theorizes that in an
aesthetic encounter with nature, imagination and understanding enter into “harmonious
play.”62 This process of reflective imagining “aesthetically enlarges the concept itself in
an unbounded fashion” and in so doing expands the subject’s possibilities for knowing.63
The dominant theme running through the introductions to music textbooks in the
nineteenth century is the reliance on the masterworks of European composers to lift
public school music “‘from mere song singing to its true function as a disciplinary,
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educational, and elevating force.’”64 By the second decade of the twentieth century, the
arts advocacy discourse takes on another layer of complexity. Not only is the music
curriculum conceptualized as a means to shaping students into rational individuals
concerned with bettering themselves, but now the public schools come to be viewed as a
structure necessary to realizing larger cultural expectations. Good music for the public
good is the message I deduce from the published objectives of the Music Supervisors
National Conference (MSNC), for example, an organization which frames its advocacy
argument in terms of “‘the promotion of good music through the instrumentality of the
public schools.’”65
A shift in power relations is evident in the MSNC document. While we can only
surmise that students may still have derived life-enhancing instrumental benefits from
their participation in school-based vocal instruction, another conceptualization of
instrumental has entered the discourse. Based on the inclusion of the phrase, “through the
instrumentality of the public schools,” it is clear that the national association representing
music educators has begun to use the term “instrumental” to convey the idea of the public
schools as a utilitarian structure capable of advancing music advocacy goals. The term
“instrumental” continues to be used in both arts advocacy texts and in scholarly critiques
of advocacy claims to denote the concept of using the arts as a means to achieve
utilitarian ends tangential to arts-centered inquiry.
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Selling Arts Education
The need for a reimagining of arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism
becomes increasingly urgent when the arts advocacy debate is viewed through a critical
lens. Referring to visual art education, John Howell White points out that long-standing
philosophical tensions between the self and society affect how mediated visual images,
for example, are to be “transported, understood, critiqued, emulated, and resisted.”66 A
related critical issue concerns the justification put forth by arts education advocates that
students need art and music in schools in order to become wise consumers of the arts.
The question arises as to whose interests are being served by the promotion of the arts as
a commodity.
History provides us with a glimpse into the business of arts education in the
United States. Between 1870 and 1907, legislative bodies in 12 states passed laws
establishing drawing as a required subject in public schools, and during this same period,
cities and towns in 31 other states approved the teaching of drawing as a school subject.67
Not surprisingly, the art education market became a lucrative segment of the textbook
publishing field as school-based drawing instruction spread throughout the United
States.68 Concurrently, civic organizations that were founded on the belief that decorating
school buildings with art reproductions would help shape student character and taste
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expanded their efforts to include the systematic study of masterpieces whose subject
matter carried moral lessons.69 Called “picture study,” the movement relied on suppliers
like the Prang Educational Company to provide the mass-produced black and white or
sepia reproductions that were used in public school art education programs.70
As Stankiewicz, Amburgy, and Bolin point out, art education in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century was located “in the political context of
northeastern industrial expansion and the cultural context of European academic art
traditions.”71 Grammar school teachers, largely untrained in art, turned to textbooks and
school art periodicals for guidance in providing grade-appropriate instruction, while
professional associations of art educators merged ideas from the Kindergarten movement,
progressive education, and manual training to direct curriculum design within art
education.72 Thus, selling arts education to the American public meant reconciling
capitalist-based utilitarian rationales with the philosophically pragmatic argument that
experiences in visual art enhance intellectual and emotional growth.73
Technology helped sell arts education. Advances in printing made instruction in
both drawing and art appreciation accessible to an increasingly broad cross-section of the
public school population. Beginning in the 1920s, as White notes, radio broadcasts were
also used to teach adults and students how to make art and appreciate beauty in everyday
69
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objects.74 Around the same time, the introduction of Victor audio recordings for
classroom use shifted the instructional focus in music education from singing simple
arrangements of European masterworks to listening to and apprehending their complex
formal stylistic elements.75 Goble argues that emerging music technologies influenced the
music advocacy discourse as well. First, the availability of high-quality music recordings
for classroom instruction meant music was regarded “not just as a product of the human
mind but also as a marketable product of art or entertainment.”76 A related impact was
that student musical performance no longer served as the primary medium for
experiencing musical masterworks but instead came to be viewed as “a means of
emotional experience, expression, and release.”77
In his overview of American music textbooks, Eric Branscome notes that during
this time period, music textbook writers and publishers began to incorporate ideas held by
John Dewey and other pragmatist thinkers emphasizing the importance of student interest
and participation in the learning process.78 Similarly in visual art, White argues that
because European Modernism envisioned change based on individual experience and
action, it aligned with American Pragmatist ideas. Describing the pragmatist approach to
inquiry, for example, White writes: “That philosophy, which associates inquiry with
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embodied responses to a changing world, provides a framework through which art
education found a place in schooling.”79 In White’s view, the emphasis on learning by
doing led artists, scientists, and educators to search for underlying principles to guide and
frame the “moral, aesthetic, and instrumental aspects of their inquiry.”80
It is important to note here that White connects the Enlightenment notion of
universal principles of taste, which derive from culturally-constructed conceptualizations
based on perceived sensory relationships, with the twentieth-century idea of universal
principles of design, which “promised the democratization of beauty, even though it was
accomplished through the abstraction of visual experience into intellectual categories
through language.”81 Yet White is careful to note that John Dewey, in developing an art
education program for philanthropist and art collector Albert C. Barnes, “went beyond
the moral lessons of picture study and the pure formalism of Dow, Ross, and
Hambridge,”82 instead contextualizing the Barnes collection to reintegrate art and life.83
The collaboration of Dewey and Barnes serves as a metaphor for the tensions,
ironies, and contradictions in play within art and music education in the first half of the
twentieth century. As Albert Levi points out, Dewey opens Art as Experience with a
“virulent attack upon art museums and capitalist art collectors” while dedicating the book
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“in gratitude” to Barnes, himself a capitalist art collector.84 Levi attempts to reconcile the
apparent contradiction by offering a conceptualization of today’s public art museum as
“indispensable instrument in the great task of aesthetic education.”85 Levi’s interpretation
misses the point, however, since he conflates the idea of aesthetics education with
Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience. Cultural institutions such as art museums and
symphony orchestras, for example, promote educational outreach efforts in fulfillment of
conditions for receiving public funding, the presupposition being that aesthetics
education in the form of arts-based school field trips will secure a base of future support.
In contrast, Dewey’s philosophy of art, which seeks to restore continuity between
aesthetic experience and everyday living, flows from his naturalistic stance that sees the
live creature in transaction with the environment.86
Growth as well as continuity characterize Dewey’s philosophy of education in the
sense that what one learns in one situation “becomes an instrument of understanding and
dealing effectively with the situations which follow.”87 In the next section, I analyze
scholarly critiques of advocacy claims made over the past decade to argue, following
Susanne Langer, that the many paradoxes evident within the arts education advocacy
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discourse impel philosophical inquiry.88 In order to expose, analyze, and correct the tacit
presuppositions underlying basic premises, I adopt a pragmatist approach to inquiry and
reject dualisms that place limits on possibilities for knowing. In the place of justifications
and rationales for arts education that reify and perpetuate narrow conceptualization of arts
learning, I propose pragmatic instrumentalism as a more expansive, fluid, and generative
reconstruction of arts-centered inquiry. In reimagining arts-centered inquiry in terms of
its consequences for student learning, I argue for the possibility of an expanded advocacy
discourse among researchers, educators, policymakers, and the public that conceptualizes
the arts in schools as instruments of transformation for individuals living connected lives.

Reconceptualizing the Debate Over Instrumental Outcomes
In an article first published in 1993, Karen Hamblen reminds readers that over the
years advocates for the inclusion of art instruction in the school curriculum have offered
rationales representing diverse philosophical perspectives. A century ago, for example,
some arts advocates argued that drawing lessons refined technical skills that were directly
transferable to industry jobs, while others associated art with refinement and made claims
regarding art’s intrinsic value. More recently, advocates have sought to promote the study
of art for its purported connections to creativity, critical thinking, self-awareness, social
adjustment, increased motivation, and higher test scores.89 Hamblen argues that even
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though support for instrumental outcomes has been weakened by “overstated,
unsubstantiated, and politically motivated assumptions,”90 the instrumentalist approach to
art instruction remains philosophically sound. In Hamblen’s view, art study provides
students with experiences very different from those found in other areas of the
curriculum, giving students “a sense of value and purpose.”91
Noting that advocacy claims often lack theoretical footing, Hamblen supports her
instrumentalist argument by citing Susanne Langer’s idea that cognition subsumes many
ways of knowing and experiencing: qualitative, relational, connotative, and affective.92
Hamblen also argues that the broader approach to teaching art in the context of history,
aesthetics, and criticism extends opportunities for students to engage in critical inquiry,
examining “hypotheses, statements of value, and the ambiguities of artistic meanings and
designations.”93 For Hamblen, the emphasis on big questions entailed in an inquiry
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approach to arts education expands the possibilities for making substantive connections
across domains.94
Hamblen concludes that while instrumental outcomes should be neither the goal
nor the rationale for arts programs, theory and practice indicate that arts-centered learning
provides opportunities for linkages across disciplines when instruction directly attends to
those connections. Such linkages can promote the development of creativity and critical
thinking skills which may in turn translate to enhanced academic achievement.95
Liora Bresler, also writing in the 1990s, similarly argues that although humanistic
and instrumental research orientations differ with respect to the role of the arts in the
curriculum, they need not be considered mutually exclusive, depending on how broadly
instrumental is conceptualized.96 Like Hamblen, Bresler points out that the arts fulfill
both economic and democratic functions within the educational system. She writes:
The attempt to ground the arts in a pragmatic, instrumentalist framework
has characterized arts education since its introduction to formal schooling
in the nineteenth century, when advocates emphasized the arts’ contributions
to the world of work (for example, in drawing skills) and to good citizenship.
“School arts” is a hybrid genre, existing between the educational and the
artistic. Artistic forms and values are transformed or created as they enter
the embrace of the school institution, assuming the look, practices, and
goals of academic subject matters.97
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Bresler draws a clear distinction between instrumentalist and utilitarian approaches to
education. She argues: “A utilitarian approach to education is promoted by the voices of
businesses and community members that associate education primarily with jobs, the
economy, and the production of good citizens.”98 Warning that since education involves
initiating the young into the norms and beliefs of the society they inhabit, it is necessary
to consider whose values are being advocated in research, policy, and practice. According
to Bresler, the tensions within arts education resulting from narrowly conceived
justifications for its educational value “reflect the problematic nature of a field that is not
critical of itself.”99
Thomas Brewer also calls attention to the lack of criticality within arts education,
resulting in a climate in which advocacy, research, and policy are interdependent to the
point that “the strength and quality of one has a considerable impact on the others.”100 To
illustrate his point, Brewer offers the typical scenario in which a school board member or
principal asks for a one-page report about the instrumental impact of the arts on learning
in non-arts subjects rather than a research summary of indicators pointing to student
learning in the art forms themselves. As long as arts educators continue to respond to
policymakers’ requests with advocacy claims based on questionable research
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methodologies, Brewer sees negative consequences for arts education, its quality diluted
“to make it economically and politically palatable.”101
Pointing out the contradictions inherent in an educational climate that places
advocacy marketing campaigns ahead of inquiry, Brewer asks, “To what end are national
and state advocacy and research efforts leading?” and “Should the advocates be the
policymakers?”102 The work of Constance Bumgarner Gee interrogates the blurring of
boundaries between advocacy and research and between advocacy and policy. After
examining the intended and unintended consequences of organized arts advocacy efforts,
Gee came close to arriving at “the sad conclusion that, try as we might to brake its
forward motion, the momentum of the marketing machine was so powerful as to be
unstoppable.”103 The next section will further probe the interrelationships among
advocacy, practice, research, and policy since the late 1990s to provide context for the
conceptual analysis of current arts advocacy claims that I present in Chapter 3.

101

Brewer, “Arts Education Advocacy and Research,” 16.

102

Ibid.

103

Constance Bumgarner Gee, “Spirit, Mind, and Body: Arts Education the
Redeemer,” in Handbook of Research and Policy in Art Education, eds. Elliot W. Eisner
and Michael D. Day (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004), 116. See also
Constance Bumgarner Gee, “The ‘Use and Abuse’ of Arts Advocacy and Consequences
for Music Education.” Arts Education Policy Review 103, no. 4 (March/April 2002): 321.

34
Philosophical Tensions Between Advocacy and Practice
A decade ago, the arts advocacy debate centered on claims of cognitive transfer
across subject areas, the veracity of which was largely unsupported by the research.104
While instrumental outcomes persist as a core theme in the arts education advocacy
discourse, I argue that the focus is shifting in an explicitly utilitarian direction, with arts
education increasingly placed in the service of realizing national economic goals. This
section will lay the groundwork for my expanded reconceptualization of arts-centered
inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism, a philosophical stance that reaffirms the value of
generative arts learning for individuals and schools, enlarges possibilities for substantive
educational research, and repositions arts education policy as necessary for cultural
vitality in a democratic society.
For the purposes of this inquiry, I based my philosophical and conceptual analysis
on evidence published online by major organizations based in Washington, DC which
produce arts education advocacy messages designed for national distribution and
consumption. Gee identifies the principal governmental entities responsible for
generating advocacy texts as Americans for the Arts, the National Endowment for the
Arts, the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies, the Kennedy Center Alliance for
Arts Education, the Arts Education Partnership, and the President’s Committee on the
Arts and Humanities.105 According to Gee, “these federal arts agencies and federalized

104

See Ellen Winner and Monica Cooper, “Mute Those Claims: No Evidence
(Yet) for a Causal Link between Arts Study and Academic Achievement,” Journal of
Aesthetic Education 34, nos. 3-4 (Fall/Winter 2000): 11-75.
105

Gee, “Spirit, Mind, and Body,” 116. I also examined advocacy materials
published online by MENC: The National Association for Music Education and the

35
arts organizations, virtually one and the same with shared administrative staff, board
membership, and advisory panels (and, therefore, philosophy and missions), are largely
interchangeable.”106 Gee points to recurring themes running through the advocacy
documents produced by these organizations. Intended to persuade policymakers and the
public of the need to continue funding the arts, these advocacy texts offer three broad
justifications for arts education, namely, that arts study improves social development,
academic achievement, and emotional well-being in students.107
Gee rejects the reliability of arts advocacy claims made by federal arts agencies,
arguing that “most of the assertions about the effects of arts study/experience/exposure on
math, reading, and test taking are much more assumption than fact.”108 Moreover, she
asserts, advocacy claims have little to do with the fundamentals of arts teaching and
learning, aside from engendering confusion in some and cynicism in others.”109 In Gee’s
view, most arts educators
do not teach music to improve math scores; they do not teach visual arts to
improve reading skills. They teach because they love the art form and they
want others to love it. They teach because they believe that artmaking is an
immensely satisfying experience; and they believe that knowing about artistic
forms and traditions makes life in general a more satisfying experience.110
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Samuel Hope takes a similar stance when he connects the viability of arts education to
the actions of its practitioners:
There is no apparent direct link between the survival of any governmental
arts or education entity in Washington and the survival of art education as a
field. The strategic survival issues are placed elsewhere and are not linked
to federal agencies and quangos (quasi-autonomous governmental organizations, e.g., the President’s Committee on the Arts and Humanities, The Arts
Education Partnership) as much as to ideas, professional practice, students,
and local resource streams.111
Viewed through a Deweyan lens, both Gee and Hope argue for valuing arts education as
a distinctive discipline best judged according to the extent to which substantive ideas,
mediated in arts-centered practice and supported by thoughtful arts education policy,
have generative learning consequences for students.
Organized arts advocacy campaigns, by way of contrast, use messages and
methods to frame arts education as a commodity. According to Gee, the federal funding
structure “provides a direct means for the buying of favor and funding and for the selling
of services.”112 For Gee, arts advocacy connotes “what we proclaim art will do for the
individual and society in return for investments of time, love, and money.”113
The lines separating practice, advocacy, research, and policy are rarely so clearly
defined, however. While conducting a targeted review of music education advocacy
literature, for example, Gee noted ambivalence toward the role of advocacy within the
field. In examining advocacy-related texts, Gee found that “professional education
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organizations such as MENC walk a tightwire between scholarly interests and political
activism,”114 publishing both advocacy claims based on research findings and scholarly
critiques of those same research findings.115
The ambivalence toward federal arts advocacy efforts which Gee attributes to arts
educators stems from tensions going back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the
National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) shifted public attention away from the funding
of art and toward the support of arts education partnerships in schools. As James Modrick
argues, funding schoolchildren offered a “politically safe refuge” for nonprofit arts
organizations.116 The shift in emphasis away from funding potentially controversial
artists and toward arts education continues to provide legislators who fund federal arts
agencies opportunities to spread political goodwill.117
Modrick describes the way in which government-sponsored advocacy materials
have targeted policymakers with the message that in providing schools with artist
residencies, local arts organizations – funded through the NEA network – fill a void in
the public schools.118 Gee notes: “Embedded within the philosophy of the artist residency
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is the conviction that a practicing artist knows more about the art form than does the
elementary or secondary arts educator.”119 Gee’s own cynicism regarding the purported
role advocacy plays in promoting sequential arts instruction taught by certified specialists
is evident in her scholarship. Describing the complex network of mutually beneficial
relationships that sustain federally-funded arts agencies, Gee writes:
Self-promotion is the primary interest of these organizations and arts education serves them well in this respect. They seek to convince politicians,
policymakers, and community leaders that they (and their state and local
sister arts agencies and organizations and artist dependents) are essential to
the work of arts education in all venues and at all phases and levels. Through
their own in-house publications and through publication of research that they
themselves sponsored, they assert their collective importance as the primary
factor in successful arts education programming and as the main change agent
in effective reform.120
Gee argues that it is essential for arts education professionals to continue to expand and
refine their thinking about what and how they teach and why, while at the same time
remaining vigilant in not allowing “hype and political maneuvering” to trump scholarship.121 The next section will extend the discussion to address philosophical implications
of advocacy for educational research in the arts.
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Philosophical Dilemmas for Researchers of Advocacy Topics
In the early 1990s, the Consortium of National Arts Education Associations,
representing arts educators from the disciplines of music, visual art, theatre, and dance,
received a total of $1 million from the U.S. Department of Education, the National
Endowment for the Arts, and the National Endowment for the Humanities to develop
voluntary national standards for grades K-12.122 The National Standards for Arts
Education were published in 1994 and describe the knowledge and skills that all students
should acquire in the arts. As a consequence of having developed the capabilities
contained in the National Standards for the Arts document, “students can arrive at their
own knowledge, beliefs, and values for making personal and artistic decisions” based on
a “well-grounded understanding of the nature, value, and meaning of the arts as a part of
their own humanity.”123
The conceptual framework for the National Standards for Arts Education
(hereafter referred to as the National Standards) reflects the influence of Discipline-Based
Arts Education (DBAE). As Gee explains, the establishment in 1982 of the Getty
Education Institute for the Arts signaled a formalized shift toward the discipline-based
approach to teaching the arts that both structured and broadened the focus of student
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learning beyond self-expression and production.124 Gee argues that in the DBAE
theoretical approach to teaching and learning, “it was not only the work of the artist that
merited attention, but also the work of art historians, critics, and aestheticians” whose
perspectives are valued as students engage in arts-centered inquiry.125
Elliot Eisner also points out that the mission of arts education has evolved over
the course of the last century, moving from its educational role in providing a curricular
space for self-expression at the beginning of the 1900s to its current conceptualization as
a social force to reflect and shape values.126 He notes the growing public interest in the
usefulness of the arts to domains outside the arts, particularly with regard to the arts’
potential for developing complex forms of thinking.127
Eisner argues, however, that a focus on testing distracts educators from
addressing the conditions necessary “to create not only enriching arts programs for our
students but genuinely educative schools.”128 Recent evidence supports his argument. A
report published in 2007 by the Center for Education Policy shows an inverse relationship in the amount of instructional time elementary schools allotted to both English/
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Language Arts (ELA) and Math compared to the arts. Since the enactment of No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) legislation,129 77% of districts with at least one Needs Improvement
school increased time devoted to ELA, and 56% increased Math instructional time, while
30% of those same districts decreased the amount of time (the average decrease was 61
minutes per week) that students spent in art and music classes.130 The average increase in
minutes per week dedicated to ELA was 140 minutes, representing an increase of 46%
over the 2001-02 school year. What is striking is that in districts with at least one school
identified as needing improvement, corrective action, or restructuring, the increase in
ELA instructional time was 183 minutes per week, compared to districts with no
identified schools where the increase in English/Language Arts time was 122 minutes per
week.131
The disparity in time accorded English/Language Arts and Math in comparison to
Art and Music reveals presuppositions about the preferred symbolic representations
through which students are able to mediate meaning. On Eisner’s view, the verbal skills
needed to learn to read print material are unlike those required to read works of art. Arts
perception is less a matter of cracking a code and more about penetrating the surface in
order to gain a greater understanding of the relationships between the parts and the
whole. He argues that the particular form we choose in order to represent our experience
129
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of interacting with each other and with the environment “not only influences what we can
say, it also influences what we are likely to experience.”132 Eisner points out that when
schools limit opportunities for students to learn and use diverse forms of representation –
visual art, music, drama, dance, to name a few – educational equity is jeopardized. Like
Dewey, who criticized those who would equate intelligence solely with facility in verbal
and mathematical symbols,133 Eisner concludes that to restrict forms of representation is
“to deny students access to meanings that might otherwise be theirs.”134
The amount of time allotted to arts learning by a particular school provides an
indicator of the extent to which the arts are valued in that school. For schools that fall into
the “Needs Improvement” category as a result of outcomes on state testing mandated
under NCLB, the expectation is high that students will be provided the instructional
interventions necessary to help the school make its Adequate Yearly Progress targets.
Eisner’s argument concerns the moral imperative of affording all students equitable
access to opportunities for deep and meaningful learning. Following this line of
reasoning, educational research related to arts education advocacy entails philosophical
inquiry into structural impediments that limit equity of access to knowing for the nation’s
K-12 students.
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Dewey argues that philosophy of education, occupying an intermediate and
instrumental place, “neither originates nor settles ends” but instead goes back to the
experiences of education to test, confirm, modify, and suggest new methods and
materials, thereby enabling educators to see more clearly and think more critically about
what they are doing.135 I adopt Dewey’s pragmatist approach in pointing out that
effectively advocating for equitable access to high-quality arts-centered inquiry means to
argue philosophically for an expanded definition of arts education’s instrumental value
from a narrow reductive view to one which encompasses rich possibilities for growth.
From a pragmatist perspective, then, research and advocacy are not
philosophically in opposition. The advocacy discourse evident in MENC publications
serves as a case in point. Yet as Kenneth Elpus notes, “Music education’s philosopherscholars have largely ignored the true need for music education advocacy.”136 He argues,
“In dismissing the need for practical music education advocacy, the music education
philosophers are doing a grave disservice to the profession.”137 He continues: “The lack
of a strong, defensible, philosophical basis for music education advocacy arguments
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contributes to the practical advocacy crisis and makes our current advocacy practices
controversial and divisive within the profession.”138
Before expanding on aspects of MENC’s advocacy efforts that he finds
problematic, Elpus credits MENC with successfully advocating for inclusion of the arts
in national education legislation and development of the National Standards for Arts
Education.139 He then states his objections to the manner in which MENC is reconciling
research and advocacy goals: “In our efforts to simply get the listener’s attention to
deliver our message, we are selling out our professional dignity and relying on
questionable research or questionable interpretations of valid research.”140
As a way for music education to gain recognition as a core subject, Elpus
recommends that the field take the initiative in directing advocacy efforts to develop fair
and equitable assessment measures that focus on the value of arts learning within a
standards-based framework.141 Nancy Smith Fichter calls for similar action, urging arts
educators to respond imaginatively, given the current climate of accountability, with
“arts-centered paradigms for assessment and evaluation.”142
Kent Seidel sees increased efforts to open lines of communication among arts
educators, researchers, artists, and community arts resources as a way to ensure that
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research findings are not misinterpreted or overstated in advocacy campaigns.143 He also
questions the usefulness of sharing research findings only within the arts education
community when the interpretive approach to knowing employed in arts-based inquiry
has much to offer the field of educational research.144 Seidel posits that when research
focuses on what an education that includes the arts looks like, “a broader conceptualization of what education can and should be for all students” results.145
It is precisely at this intersection of research and advocacy that I call for a reimagining of arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism. Researchers may face
dilemmas in probing advocacy questions since, as Michael Blakeslee notes, a jigsaw of
complicating arts education goals may come into play: institutional goals of community
arts partners, commercial goals of educational corporations, and professional goals of
artists and teachers.146 Although Fichter’s metaphor of Babel may be more apt than
Blakeslee’s image of the jigsaw,147 I build on the insights of these two scholars. Speaking
from a Deweyan perspective, I urge researchers to listen pragmatically to the arts
education advocacy discourse for the core philosophical theme necessary to clarify and
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ground it, namely, that learning which helps students develop and grow in the arts helps
them develop and grow as individuals living connected lives.
Research findings released a decade ago illustrate the subtle but powerful ways
research can open up new directions for advocacy. A team from Project Zero,148 an
educational research group at Harvard University’s Graduate School of Education,
conducted a search of all relevant studies written in English, published and unpublished,
that appeared between 1950 and 1998 in order to “analyze the primary research testing
the claim that study of the arts is associated with improved academic outcomes.”149 They
chose for the meta-analysis 31 studies, all correlational, since no experimental studies
were available to provide a test for a causal relationship between arts study and academic
achievement.150
The researchers found that a positive relationship between studying the arts and
academic achievement does exist, but they found no evidence to suggest a causal
relationship between arts study and either verbal or math achievement.151 They offered
explanations for the findings by noting that standardized tests call for convergent thinking
while the arts engage learners in divergent thinking. Winner and Cooper, who authored
the research report cited here, add: “The arts are at a distinct disadvantage compared to
148
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academic areas when it comes to evaluating learning outcomes because, while the arts
teach measurable skills, they also teach experiences and outcomes that are inherently
difficult to measure and quantify.”152
Winner and Cooper conclude that evaluation of educational outcomes of arts
education “should be based on learning in the arts.”153 As a response to an advocacy
climate in which “the same secondary and tertiary sources” were quoted over and over,154
the research has implications for both practice and for ongoing advocacy discussions, as
noted in the report:
The arts are important human ways of understanding and knowing, no less
important than the sciences. Studying the arts should thus never be a frill,
but should be a basic part of what we expect our children to learn. If they
can be shown to aid learning in another domain, fine. But this should never
be their primary purpose.155
The research team posits that cognitive skills developed in arts study might be applied to
learning in other subjects, but transfer is unlikely to occur without explicit teaching of
those skills on the part of the teacher. Among the skills listed as candidates for cognitive
transfer are focusing, close observation, critical, divergent, or independent thinking,
problem solving, and problem finding.156 A subsequent research project conducted by a
Project Zero team will be discussed in Chapter 3 in conjunction with my conceptual
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analysis of the current arts advocacy discourse.157 The final section of Chapter 2 will
provide additional context for the philosophical analysis to follow by describing arts
education policy formulation from a pragmatist perspective.

Policy Formulation as Pragmatic Inquiry
Winner and Cooper argue that advocacy arguments justifying arts education on
utilitarian grounds are evidence of a fundamental misunderstanding of the inherent value
of the arts.158 I reiterate the distinction Liora Bresler draws between instrumentalist and
utilitarian approaches to education and her description of the latter as one “promoted by
the voices of businesses and community members that associate education primarily with
jobs, the economy, and the production of good citizens.”159 Following Bresler, I ask,
“Whose values are being advocated in research, policy, and practice?”
Samuel Hope points out that “time and experience have shattered a number of
naïve illusions” concerning how arts policy decisions are made.160 Defining policy as
“some sort of engagement with simple or complex efforts to make successful decisions or
to influence the decisions of others,”161 Hope cites marketing pressures as exerting
negative long-term consequences on arts education policy. In his view, the only research
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that matters to activists is that which supports their position. Hope argues that to
acquiesce to the images and messages of professional arts advocates and education
reformers is to lose control of the internal purpose of the field. Instead he urges
policymakers to conduct what he terms “wisdom-seeking policy analysis.”162
Hope credits the National Art Education Association with adopting a wisdomseeking approach to arts education policymaking. He considers the contributions that
research, policy, and practice make to the field of art education to be interdependent.
More important, what enables those strong connections is a commitment to the core
activity of remaining grounded in the philosophical question, “What is unique about what
we do and the content for which we are responsible?”163 Hope illustrates his point this
way:
The National Art Education Association has worked especially hard to keep
attention focused on disciplinary content, vigorous teaching, and field identity
and security. All these achievements provide a strong foundation for building
policy capabilities of greater sophistication and scope. This means an expansion
in the kinds of research associated with art education. It means more connections
with contextual issues in ways that analyze and synthesize these issues into a
relationship with the reasonable purposes of art education. It means that policy
analyses for art education must be generated by individuals centered in things
visual, or, at least, things artistic.164
In short, Hope’s words echo those of John Dewey in The Sources of a Science of
Education: “To look to some outside source to provide aims is to fail to know what
education is as an ongoing process.”165
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Hope urges arts educators to remain vigilant to political games and promotional
techniques that give the illusion of supporting arts education. He maintains an especially
critical eye toward the role of technology in arts education policy formulation. Using the
metaphor of a computer screen, Hope argues that “a major policy question is how to keep
technology from narrowing possibilities rather than expanding them.”166 He urges the arts
education community to consider the consequences when forming alliances with political
and corporate interests around the promotion and sale of educational technology.
In the next chapter, I examine pertinent arts education advocacy materials,
accessible online and in downloadable format, in order to inquire into tensions, ironies,
and contradictions that impel philosophical and conceptual analysis. My inquiry
investigates two philosophical concepts permeating the current arts advocacy discourse:
creativity and innovation. Hope maintains that because advocacy is based on promotional
technique rather than policy analysis, it does not provide a sufficient base for decision
making.167 I argue that viewing arts-centered inquiry through a Deweyan lens keeps the
focus on instrumental consequences for student development and growth in the arts.
Pointing to the irony of marketing the arts as purveyors of creativity and innovation, I
make the advocacy claim that arts-centered inquiry itself opens up inherently creative
possibilities for individual students. Sound arts education policy formulation, therefore,
represents pragmatic inquiry that conceives of creative and innovative students and
connects that conception with the educative school-based arts experiences they need.
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CHAPTER 3
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE ADVOCACY DISCOURSE
In the previous chapter, I discussed the complex relationships among practice,
research, policy, and advocacy to provide context for a conceptual analysis of the current
advocacy discourse. I now turn to an examination of pertinent examples from arts
education advocacy materials, accessible online and in downloadable format, in order to
inquire into tensions, ironies, and contradictions embedded in the discourse regarding the
instrumental role of arts education in developing creativity and fostering innovation. I
have purposefully chosen sources cited in the research literature over the last decade in
order to highlight parallels between past and current philosophical arguments. Because
my approach to philosophical inquiry is Deweyan, the conceptual analysis that follows
critiques major arguments in light of consequences for student learning. The next section
will serve as an introduction to the conceptual analysis of the advocacy discourse. It
includes a brief overview of representative agencies, organizations, research groups, and
professional arts associations who contribute their voices to the ongoing advocacy debate
over instrumental outcomes associated with arts education.

Advocating for Creativity and Innovation: An Introduction
As Constance Gee has explained, a number of the publishers of arts education
advocacy materials are based in Washington, DC and share administrative staff, boards,
and advisory panels. I gleaned evidence for this conceptual analysis from the websites of
two such entities: the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) and the Arts Education
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Partnership (AEP).168 In addition, I downloaded documents from the websites of the U.S.
Department of Education, the Partnership for 21st Century Skills, MENC: The National
Association for Music Education, and the National Art Education Association (NAEA),
all of which have offices in the Washington, DC area. Although not explicitly cited, the
advocacy texts of many dozens of arts organizations informed my thinking as I employed
the philosophical tools of conceptual analysis to support my argument for an expanded
conceptualization of arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism.169
The main theme running through the advocacy texts I examined was the role of
arts education in developing creativity and innovation, skills argued to be necessary in
order for the United States to remain globally competitive. For example, a document
entitled, “A Blueprint for Reform,” published by the U.S. Department of Education, lays
out a plan for new federal investment in improving teaching and learning in all content
areas – including the arts. The rationale is that “students need a well-rounded education
to contribute as citizens in our democracy and to thrive in a global economy.”170
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Secretary of Education Arne Duncan reiterated the theme of a well-rounded
education in an address to the Arts Education Partnership on April 9, 2010.171 According
to its website, the Arts Education Partnership (AEP) resulted from the Goals 2000 Arts
Education Planning Process in 1994. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Education and the
National Endowment for the Arts entered into a cooperative agreement with the Council
of Chief State School Officers and the National Assembly of State Arts Agencies to
provide AEP with administrative support. In 2006, the Arts Education Partnership
Steering Committee developed two strategic plans which “adopt assumptions that the arts
can play a crucial role in the public concern for a more comprehensive educational
experience for all students that prepares them for success and contributions in complex,
diverse, and technologically driven global societies and economies.”172
In his remarks, Duncan asks the Art Education Partnership to help build the
national case for the importance of a well-rounded, content-rich curriculum. He notes
three ways that arts education advocacy can assist in moving forward the debate over the
reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA):
First, the arts significantly boost student achievement, reduce discipline
problems, and increase the odds that students will go on to graduate from
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college. Second, arts education is essential to stimulating the creativity and
innovation that will prove critical to young Americans competing in a global
economy. And last, but not least, the arts are valuable for their own sake,
and they empower students to create and appreciate aesthetic works.173
Duncan concludes the speech by addressing the need for the field of arts education to
continue making progress in developing rigorous arts assessments, noting that “a wellbalanced curriculum is simply too vital to our students and our national character to let
the teaching of the arts and humanities erode.”174
The advocacy arguments outlined in Duncan’s speech to the Arts Education
Partnership are the same justifications for arts education that Gee found in her review of
the advocacy discourse a decade ago:
According to most arts advocacy literature, the improvement of the workforce to ensure economic global competitiveness remains the overarching
justification for and ultimate goal of arts education. Increasingly, however,
the development of the well-rounded, engaged citizen shares copy space.
Of course, happier, better-socialized, smarter citizens make happier, bettersocialized, smarter workers, so the reasoning dovetails nicely.175
Even claims of the same kinds of benefits arts learning offers continue to permeate the
discourse. Among the purported positive outcomes for students who study the arts that
Gee found were improved overall academic performance and standardized test scores,
enhanced personal identity and social skills, increased problem-solving, reasoning, and
communication capabilities, expanded creativity, and greater self-discipline.176
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Before continuing with the overview of major contributors to the advocacy
discourse, I want to take note of the way Duncan categorizes his justifications for arts
education. The first benefit he connects to arts learning, an increased likelihood of
college graduation due to increased achievement and decreased discipline problems,
involves an educational outcome that might be more effectively and efficiently reached
by means of targeted instruction in tested content areas and a school climate that
promotes, for example, participation in clubs. Elliot Eisner criticizes advocacy strategies
that draw associations between participation in the arts and non-arts outcomes: “To use
the arts primarily to teach what is not truly distinctive about the arts is to undermine, in
the long run, the justifying conditions for the arts in our schools.”177 Instead, Eisner offers
a three-tier framework with which to analyze educational contributions of the arts.
Increasing the likelihood of college graduation, for instance, would be considered a thirdtier Ancillary Outcome of Arts Education under Eisner’s evaluation model. It could be
argued, following Eisner’s reasoning, that participation in the arts might enable students
to see coherent relationships in other areas of life or to make better judgments in practical
matters.178
Duncan’s second justification for arts education links the arts with the
development of creativity and innovation for economic ends. Eisner terms this a secondtier or Arts-Related Outcome since it has to do with perceiving and describing the
qualitative and expressive features of the environment. By contrast, first-tier, Arts-Based
Outcomes, according to Eisner, “reside in perceptions and discourse unique to the
177
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arts.”179 In Eisner’s view, these kinds of consequences for student learning require an
understanding of the meaning-making possibilities that the constraints of working within
an artistic tradition allow.180 While Duncan acknowledges that “the arts are valuable for
their own sake, and they empower students to create and appreciate aesthetic works,”181
Eisner’s words articulate with far more depth of understanding the generative potential
arts engagement holds for subsequent student learning.
Eisner uses the term “instrumental” to refer to measurable student outcomes in
non-arts subjects which, as a consequence of their association with measures of student
participation in the arts, provide evidence to support arts advocacy claims. I concur with
Eisner that valuing arts education on the basis of outcomes in other subjects only serves
to further marginalize school arts programs.182 I differ, however, in my philosophical
approach to the concept of instrumental within the context of the arts. Rather than
resisting the term’s limitations in its narrow application within evidence-based
discussions of what works in educational settings, I seek to restore the artistic meaning of
the term. In other words, I propose pragmatic instrumentalism as a way to answer the
question, “Why teach the arts in schools?” by showing where the arts can take us.
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A Pragmatist Response to Critiques of Instrumentalist Advocacy Claims
An expanded conceptualization of the term “instrumental” pragmatically connects
arts-centered inquiry with its consequences for student growth. I offer as a counterexample to illustrate the soundness of my claim a research study conducted by the RAND
Corporation addressing individual and community benefits resulting from involvement in
the arts. In the research report, the authors describe instrumental benefits as “important,
measurable benefits, such as economic growth and student learning” but restrict their
definition to instances in which “the arts are viewed as a means of achieving broad social
and economic goals that have nothing to do with art per se.”183 Viewing the word
“instrumental” solely in terms of measurement, the research team associates instrumental
benefits with an “output-oriented, quantitative approach to public sector management.”184
As a way to reframe the debate over the benefits of the arts, McCarthy et al. propose as a
conceptual framework a matrix that takes into account instrumental, intrinsic, private
(individual), and public (community) benefits.185
The study’s key policy implication is that resources should be shifted toward
cultivating demand, by which they mean developing the capacity in individuals to derive
more value from the arts opportunities around them. A large part of such an effort would
presumably be in the area of arts education. As the argument progresses, the researchers
broaden their conceptualization of instrumental benefits beyond statistical outcomes,
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stating simply that learning how to learn “is perhaps the most important instrumental
benefit of arts education.”186
The authors of the research report note two significant elements in the learning-tolearn process, namely, monitoring one’s own learning and recognizing the contribution of
feedback to making progress. Both elements are connected to sustained learning in the
arts.187 Other benefits linked to arts learning include the development of social bonds and
an expanded capacity for empathy.188 The authors of the study conclude that “the arts,
through their communicative power, enhance individual engagement with the world in
ways that have both personal and public benefits. We even suggest that these effects are
instrumental in that they can open people to life and create the fabric of shared values and
meanings that improves the public sphere.”189
I argue from a pragmatist stance that individuals live connected lives. Whatever
benefits we seek from engagement with the arts become instrumental once we confer
meaning on those experiences as being valuable for subsequent transactions. The phrases
“intrinsic value” and “art for art’s sake” ring hollow unless students have opportunities to
engage with the arts in ways that enable them, as Maxine Greene writes, “to notice what
is there to be noticed, and to lend works of art their lives in such a way that they can
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achieve them as variously meaningful. When this happens, new connections are made in
experience: new patterns are formed, new vistas are opened.”190
By the same token, the misuse of the term “instrumental” in the advocacy
discourse in place of more precise words like “utilitarian,” “ancillary,” or “incidental”
complicates the philosophical work of providing warrant for arts-centered inquiry as
potentially and instrumentally valuable for student growth. Monroe Beardsley suggests
using the term “inherent value” rather than “intrinsic value” to distinguish enriching arts
experiences – those connected with particular aesthetic qualities we perceive – from
effects of a more incidental nature.191 The following passage from McCarthy, et al.,
illustrates the clarity that making such a substitution would achieve in arguing on behalf
of arts education:
Whether it is the immediate delight and wonder that the arts experience can
trigger or the cognitive benefits that come from more sustained arts involvement, the intrinsic benefits derived from the experience are what motivate
individuals to become involved in the arts. Indeed, only by focusing on individual experience can one understand how individuals become drawn to the
arts in the first place, how they develop sustained interest, and how they access
many of the effects we have described. From this perspective, it becomes clear
that not much is gained by separating the discussion of instrumental effects
from that of intrinsic effects – the two are intimately linked. Participation in
the arts is motivated by intrinsic benefits derived from arts experiences, and
it is only through such experiences that a variety of instrumental benefits can
be realized.192

190

Maxine Greene, Variations on a Blue Guitar: The Lincoln Center Institute
Lectures on Aesthetic Education (New York: Teachers College Press, 2001), 6.
191

Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Aesthetic Problem of Justification,” Journal of
Aesthetic Education 1, no. 2 (Autumn 1966): 29-39, 34.
192

McCarthy et al., Gifts of the Muse, 70.

60
The sedimentation of commonly-held assumptions surrounding the terms “intrinsic” and
“instrumental” led to their use in opposition to each other.193 Beardsley employs the tools
of analytic philosophy to expose the fallacious reasoning in the debate between intrinsic
and instrumental value in the arts.
Beardsley begins his argument by showing how the genus “value” has over time
been divided up into two species, “intrinsic value” and “extrinsic value.” Yet, as
Beardsley notes, intrinsic and extrinsic are not coordinate species but rather relational in
the sense that some extrinsic value will derive from its serving as a means to good. Thus,
instrumental value is conferred upon an art work or arts experience such that it becomes
an instrument of value.194 Moreover, Beardsley continues, the rational justification for
conferring value on a work of art is a matter of empirical confirmation, without any
previous consideration of intrinsic value.195
In summary, Beardsley shows the fallacious reasoning behind Assumption (I) that
whatever portion of an artwork’s value that is not intrinsic is its extrinsic value. Next, he
shows how, by substitution, extrinsic has come to mean instrumental, thereby setting up
Assumption (II) that a work of art has either intrinsic or instrumental value but never
both. In other words, the terms “intrinsic” and “instrumental” erroneously have been held
to be mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Beardsley therefore rejects (II), arguing
that unless the value of a work of art is tied to actual or possible experiencing of the
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artwork, it becomes difficult to establish its capacity for producing a beneficial effect.196
Since the work’s capacity for producing such an effect consists in instrumentality,
however, Beardsley cautions that the instrumentality we experience when we interact
with a work of art is only provisionally valuable since we can only say that a painting or
an opera or a play has instrumental value insofar as the artwork connects to something we
value.197
Because the terms erroneously have been held to be mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive, the current advocacy debate sounds eerily like that of a decade ago. In
the next section I will bring together voices representing arts agencies, research, policy,
and practice in order to show how misapplication of the terms “intrinsic” and
“instrumental” impede clearer articulations of the concepts of creativity and innovation in
the advocacy discourse.

The Conceptualization of Creativity and Innovation in Advocacy Texts
The National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) was established by Congress in
1965 as an independent agency of the federal government charged with awarding grants
“to support artistic excellence, creativity, and innovation for the benefit of individuals
and communities.”198 According to the NEA website, the agency’s slogan, “Art Works,”
incorporates three meanings: the works of art themselves, what happens in arts
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encounters, and the impact of arts-related jobs on the nation’s economy, which “together
are the intrinsic value of the arts.”199
The Chairman of the NEA, Rocco Landesman, did not refer to the intrinsic value
of the arts when he spoke before the Arts Education Partnership on April 9, 2010 to enlist
AEP help in advocating for more arts education across the nation. Like Duncan, who
appeared on the same program, Landesman made the claim that “the arts help maintain
our competitive edge by engendering innovation and creativity.”200 Yet his
conceptualization of the instrumental role of arts education as a model for education
systems is far more nuanced than that articulated by Duncan, who uses the phrase, “wellrounded” to describe a curriculum that includes the arts.201 Speaking in his capacity as the
NEA Chairman addressing one of his agency’s partners, Landesman frames the ideal arts
education as one offered by a partnership of classroom teachers, arts specialists, teaching
artists, and arts and community organizations. Drawing on his experience as a Broadway
producer, he stresses the need for collaboration in classrooms, likening them to “affinity
spaces” where knowledge moves in many directions simultaneously.202
In his speech to the Arts Education Partnership, Landesman draws a parallel
between the collaboration that is central to a jazz ensemble and the complex of learning

199

National Endowment for the Arts, “About Art Works,” National Endowment
for the Arts, http://www.arts.gov/artworks/?page_id=79 (accessed January 12, 2011).
200

National Endowment for the Arts, “Rocco Landesman Comments at the Arts
Education Partnership’s Opening Plenary,” National Endowment for the Arts,
http://www.arts.gov/news/news10/ELI-Rocco.html (accessed December 26, 2010), ¶ 17.
201

U.S. Department of Education, “The Well-Rounded Curriculum,” ¶ 5.

202

National Endowment for the Arts, “Rocco Landesman Comments,” ¶ 45.

63
transactions that characterize a twenty-first century classroom. Unlike Arne Duncan, who
describes arts integration in terms of students singing songs about gravity and the
planets,203 Landesman’s conceptual understanding of what happens in arts-centered
inquiry includes the development of two habits that he claims would have instrumental
consequences for reforming education, namely, the “lessons” of strategic thinking and
productive failure.204 Landesman also connects the fostering of innovation with learning
environments that emphasize creative problem-solving strategies over rote memorization;
innovation happens in spaces where it is okay to fail and noble to try again. In
Landesman’s vision I see possibilities for stakeholders in advocacy, research, policy, and
practice beginning a conversation in which the instrumental value of the arts is conceived
in terms of learning in the arts. I argue that reimagining arts-centered inquiry as
pragmatic instrumentalism opens up these possibilities. The next section elaborates on the
concept of inquiry from a pragmatist perspective.

Viewing Inquiry as an Instrument
Because my argument is grounded in a Deweyan analysis that conceptualizes artscentered inquiry as a human value meeting a human need, the work of James Garrison
provides guidance, particularly in clarifying how I examine and judge the soundness of
scholarly arguments that critique advocacy claims. As an inquiry into inquiry, I adopt
Garrison’s definition of inquiry as “the creative activity of transforming needful
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situations into more desirable circumstances.”205 According to Garrison, inquiry is as
much a moral task as an aesthetic adventure because imagining possibilities that expand
freedom requires practical wisdom and practical reasoning to ensure that consequences of
action are morally desirable, not merely desired.206
I apply Garrison’s interpretation of Deweyan “transactional realism” to learning
transactions within the context of visual art, music, theatre, or dance instruction. Garrison
illustrates transactional realism in schools:
In transactional relationships between teacher and student, the potential
of the student is actualized when she learns. She may learn how to do
something, or that something is true or false, or perhaps that some things
are more desirable than others. … The teacher and student transaction can
be reciprocally transformative. Actualizing potentialities is creative. It
bestows value on others by helping them to realize their unique potential.
It resembles the sculptor shaping the stone to call forth the image hidden
within. It is a perceptive and imaginative activity requiring us to “see”
the possible in the actual.207
Viewing arts-centered inquiry in this light means “understanding what a technique is
good for – indeed, whether it is genuinely good at all.”208 Inquiry is an instrument that,
according to Garrison, “artistically mediates between the actual and the possible, just as it
cognitively mediates between ignorance and knowledge.”209 In this dissertation I seek to
illuminate possibilities for advancing arts advocacy policy discussions by pragmatically
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conceiving consequences for student learning that are not final but rather generative to
subsequent learning. To remain otherwise entrenched in short-sighted educational policy
objectives poses the ironic educational scenario of employing targeted interventions
designed to boost achievement outcomes or spark innovation without attending to
nurturing the deep structural understandings on which individual creativity depends.
Dewey’s conceptualization of artistic production as pragmatic instrumentalism
provides the philosophical grounding for my argument that arts-centered inquiry belongs
in schools. Inquiry demands creativity in the reiterative process of imagining possible
consequences of actions and choosing among alternative courses of action to shape
subsequent albeit provisional outcomes. Arts-centered inquiry creatively probes the
creative process itself; students reflect on how working with artistic media within
traditions of practice affords individuals living connected lives powerful ways to make
meaning. Reimagining arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism connects
creative action with its fruits for subsequent learning within the context of the wider
community. And there is precedent in our nation’s history for bridging the conceptual
divide between creativity and instrumentality. The arts advocacy discourse emerging
between 1790 and 1840, for example, conceptualized art making as an intellectual project
but broadened the justification argument to emphasize the connection between artistic
communication of human ideals and a democratically functioning social order.
Conceived in this way, not only could the technical aspects of art making be taught to
individuals with natural talent, but principles of art criticism could be taught to the wider
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population. The thinking was that as Americans improved their individual creative and
critical faculties, the nation as a whole would benefit.210
I maintain that arts-centered inquiry, though not sufficient for carrying out the
entire instrumental work of a comprehensive curriculum, nevertheless contributes to
fostering growth and continuity within it; there is a moral dimension to consider when
warranting its value for students and for the wider community. As Beardsley so
convincingly argues, Dewey’s rejection of the notion of intrinsic value has important
social and ethical implications because it underscores Dewey’s commitment to
connecting values with human needs.211 Elliot Eisner argues that the particular form we
choose in order to represent our experience of interacting with each other and with the
environment “not only influences what we can say, it also influences what we are likely
to experience.”212 He points out that when schools limit opportunities for students to learn
and use diverse forms of representation – visual art, music, drama, dance, to name a few
– educational equity is jeopardized. Like Dewey, who criticized those who would equate
intelligence solely with facility in verbal and mathematical symbols,213 Eisner concludes
that to restrict forms of representation is “to deny students access to meanings that might
otherwise be theirs.”214
In addition to making the case that advocating for a greater valuing of the arts in
schools has a moral dimension, I adopt the Deweyan approach that creative inquiry unites
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aspects of science and art rather than placing the two in opposition. In fact, Dewey argues
that both science and art become unnatural and inartistic when they are reduced to blind
routine. Alternatively, when cause-and-effect relationships are transformed in our
understanding into meaningful experiences where “consequences belong integrally to the
conditions which may produce them,” then our conscious ideas – as works of art –
liberate subsequent action to create more meanings.215 What distinguishes arts perception,
Dewey notes, is that the invitation to pursue these possibilities for further meaning
making, to directly sense the intersection of the instrumental and the consummatory both
in aesthetic appreciation and artistic production, is particularly urgent and compelling.216
Craig Cunningham points to evidence in Dewey’s later writings of a theoretical
shift from a scientifically-framed concern for student capacity to a more artisticallyinformed interest in potentiality.217 Cunningham cites in particular a passage from his
earlier Democracy and Education in which Dewey advises educators to take into
consideration the needs of students when designing learning environments in order to
“liberate and organize” their capacities.218 In contrast to this passage, Cunningham points
to later works in which aesthetics plays a much greater role in imagining the
consequences of various choices. The following excerpt from Experience and Nature
supports Cunningham’s general claim:
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To perceive is to acknowledge unattained possibilities; it is to refer the
present to consequences, apparition to issue, and thereby to behave in deference to the connections of events. As an attitude, perception or awareness is
predictive expectancy, wariness. Since potential consequences also mark the
thing itself, and form its nature, the event thus marked becomes an object of
contemplation; as meaning, future consequences already belong to the thing.
The act of striving to bring them existentially into the world may be commuted
into esthetic enjoyed possession of form.219
To NEA Chairman Landesman and others who look to arts education to unlock the
potential for creativity and innovation among the nation’s students, I quote Maxine
Greene, who reminds us that “the arts cannot be counted on to liberate,”220 but they can
help open up spaces where emancipatory education is possible. Dewey defines education
as the reconstruction of experience to better perceive meaningful connections and
continuities and more effectively direct activity in subsequent experience.221 The next
section will outline research conducted under the auspices of Harvard University’s
Project Zero that posits a Studio Thinking Framework to conceptualize the ways in which
arts-centered inquiry develops habits potentially instrumental to subsequent learning in
and beyond arts domains. The study has implications for future directions in arts
education advocacy.
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The Studio Thinking Framework
Dewey describes the two principles of continuity and interaction as “the
longitudinal and lateral aspects of experience.”222 In designing the conditions for learning
experiences, he argues, educators must exercise wisdom in judging which attitudes and
habits are being developed that are conducive to students’ continued growth and which
are detrimental.223 Consistent with the naturalistic stance that sees the live creature in
transaction with the environment is Dewey’s philosophy of art, with its primary task of
restoring continuity between aesthetic experience and everyday living.224
Inquiring into the connection between habits formed in visual arts classes and
students’ engagement with the world provides a Deweyan framework for my conceptual
analysis of a recent Project Zero study by Hetland, et al., probing the benefits of studying
the arts.225 The team of researchers observed, filmed, and interviewed five Boston-area
visual arts teachers to understand what kinds of thinking are developed through study in
the arts.226 I concur with their philosophical position that justifying the arts on the basis of
their utilitarian value in teaching the content of other subjects devalues the arts and
threatens their viability in the current high-stakes testing environment.227 I argue,
however, that in citing the conclusions of the RAND report (mentioned above) that
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“instrumental claims about the effects of arts education on learning in other subjects go
far beyond the evidence,”228 Hetland, et al., conflate the terms “utilitarian” and
“instrumental.”
The data collected as part of the Boston area study led Hetland, et al., to develop a
Studio Thinking Framework comprised of eight Studio Habits of Mind: Develop Craft,
Engage and Persist, Envision, Express, Observe, Reflect, Stretch and Explore, and
Understand Art World.229 Arguably, the five visual arts teachers whose classes were the
focus of the case studies align philosophically with Dewey in that they each draw on the
wisdom of their experience to produce conditions in which their students develop
attitudes and habits instrumental to continued growth.230 Ironically, the researchers’
criticism of previous arts-focused studies as evidence of what they term “the failure of
instrumental arguments”231 contradicts the philosophical premise of their Studio Thinking
Framework. The framework itself represents a conceptualization of instrumental benefits
associated with participation in arts experiences, namely, the development of the Studio
Habits of Mind.
When viewed through a Deweyan lens, Studio Thinking restores the continuity
between the arts studio and everyday life in the way it challenges students “to put skills to
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use in new contexts”232 and “notice the world around and connect it to learning in art.”233
The research supports my argument that reimagining arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic
instrumentalism offers advocates, researchers, and practitioners sound philosophical
grounding for making the claim that students need arts education in schools. The study
also calls attention to the important distinction between fostering innovation in schools
for utilitarian ends and supporting students as they develop the studio habit of innovating
through exploration.
In an article summarizing the Studio Thinking research, Winner and Hetland note
that “Stretch and Explore” is a central skill explicitly taught by all five of the art teachers
observed. The common theme emerging in these teachers’ practice is that they are all
committed to getting students to experiment, take risks, and let mistakes lead to
unexpected discoveries.234 Just as important for student growth in the arts and beyond is
the habit of reflective self-evaluation, whereby students learn to stand back, analyze,
judge, and entirely reconceive the project if necessary.
In constructing the Studio Thinking theoretical framework from their data
analysis, the Project Zero evaluators were surprised to find that in arts-centered inquiry,
“teachers talked about decisions, choices, and understandings far more than they talked
about feelings.”235 (A Deweyan approach to inquiry in which “consequences belong
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integrally to the conditions which may produce them”236 sees no incongruity between
artistic process and the working out of problems.) While remaining cautious about
making claims of cognitive transfer between arts and non-arts domains, the research team
sees the framework easily adapted to other arts disciplines. They recommend that the arts
be used “to restore balance and depth to an education system increasingly skewed toward
readily testable skills and information.”237
The Project Zero researchers, like NEA Chairman Landesman, consider
productive failure and strategic thinking both to be fundamental to an expanded
conceptualization of arts education. The Studio Thinking research team also sees the arts
as a model for how classroom teachers might offer “just-in-time” interventions or
conduct group problem-solving sessions.238 As Samuel Hope cautions, however, “If art
education has every purpose, then it has no purpose of its own.”239 In the next section, I
examine advocacy texts posted on the homepages of MENC: The National Association
for Music Education and the National Art Education Association (NAEA), as well as
advocacy texts electronically linked to those two organizations’ websites sponsored by
the Partnership for 21st Century Skills (P21). My purpose is to show how tensions,
ironies, and contradictions at the digital intersection of practice, research, policy, and
corporate sponsorship further complicate attempts to offer the advocacy discourse
philosophical grounding.
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Philosophical Analysis in a Grab-and-Go Environment
As Dewey argues, the philosophy of education, occupying an intermediate and
instrumental place, “neither originates nor settles ends” but instead goes back to the
experiences of education to test, confirm, modify, and suggest new methods and
materials, thereby enabling educators to see more clearly and think more critically about
what they are doing.240 To engage in a philosophical analysis of the arts education
advocacy discourse, therefore, I entered the online sites accessible to and targeted toward
music and art education practitioners in order to critically examine the online text posted
there by two professional organizations representing arts educators, MENC (music) and
NAEA (art). I kept the focus on the two interrelated advocacy themes of the last decade,
valuing arts education for the ways it helps students succeed in school and valuing arts
education for the ways it develops creativity and innovation for economic ends.
The MENC Advocacy and Public Policy page lists the ways MENC advocates for
music education, including sponsoring national events like the World’s Largest Concert,
producing and distributing one-minute public service announcements recorded by music
industry artists, and compiling facts, quotations, research, and statistics on music
education. The “Grab and Go Advocacy” flyer, available for download, provides an
example of the philosophical approach implicit within the MENC texts. Available in two
formats, a red and orange version with diagonal text entitled, “Crisis Management: When
Times Get Tough…” and the blue and green version entitled, “Proactive Strategy: When
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Times Are Good….”241 The crisis-oriented flyer advises music educators to include
personal anecdotes about their programs because “legislators/administrators remember
anecdotes better than facts. Too many statistics can be overwhelming.”242
To assist educators in assembling an advocacy argument, MENC provides a link
to a “Make Your Case” database, where practitioners can search for anecdotes,
quotations, and short excerpts from secondary sources on topics that largely emphasize
the contribution of music to student success in school and as citizens in the twenty-first
century.243 The advocacy page also features a sidebar with links to federal and state sites.
Of particular note for the purposes of this conceptual analysis is the link entitled,
“Legislative Memo,” which provides MENC’s 75,000 members online updates on music
education policy issues.244
As one might expect, the homepage of the National Art Education Association
has dynamic and interactive features that draw the eye to the theme for the association’s
national conference, “Creativity, Imagination, & Innovation in Art Education.”245 The
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text and graphics on the Advocacy page urge visitors to the site to communicate a clear
message in their advocacy efforts. To find out what the message is, one must click on the
word “Message” in order to learn the answer to the question, “Why is learning in the
visual arts essential to education in the 21st century?” The answer encompasses all the
arts: to strengthen literacy (in the sense that the arts are a language), to develop the
essential skills of a globally competitive workforce, and to nurture engaged learners by
promoting active and complex learning.246 On the same page are tools and links to assist
in developing an advocacy message. Among the tools is a downloadable flyer entitled,
“Ten Lessons the Arts Can Teach” with excerpts from Elliot Eisner’s The Arts and the
Creation of Mind.247 The links connect directly to research reports prepared by Harvard’s
Project Zero, the Arts Education Partnership, and arts entities whose advocacy materials
align with the NAEA message.
Both the MENC: The National Association for Music Education and the National
Art Education Association websites link to the Partnership for 21st Century Skills Map
for the Arts. According to the Partnership for 21st Century Skills (P21) website, the arts
skills map, designed in cooperation with the nation’s arts educators and released in 2010,
follows similar documents for English, Social Studies, Science, and Geography. The
skills maps “support a vision for learning to ensure 21st century readiness for every
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student.”248 Graphically depicted at the center of the P21 conceptual framework are a set
of student outcomes categorized as Learning and Innovation Skills, or the 4Cs: Creativity
and Innovation, Critical Thinking and Problem Solving, Communication, and
Collaboration.249
The Partnership for 21st Century Skills was formed in 2002 as a public-private
organization whose members include the National Education Association, AOL Time
Warner Foundation, Apple Computer, Cable in the Classroom, Cisco Systems, Dell
Computer Corporation, Microsoft Corporation, and SAP, a major business software
company, with the U.S. Department of Education serving as a key partner.250 Professional
arts educators served as writers for the Skills Map for the Arts, and one of the project
managers was Michael Blakeslee, Senior Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating
Officer of MENC: The National Association for Music Education. Two organizations
sponsored the arts skills map project, the National Education Association and the New
Media Consortium.
All five P21 skills maps are organized around 13 skill areas: Critical Thinking and
Problem Solving, Communication, Collaboration, Creativity, Innovation, Information
Literacy, Media Literacy, Information, Communication, and Technology Literacy,
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Flexibility and Adaptability, Initiative and Self-Direction, Social and Cross-Cultural
Skills, Productivity and Accountability, and Leadership and Responsibility. I use the arts
skills map as a counter-example to support the central argument of this dissertation. I
assert that when the voices of corporate interests promoting utilitarian student outcomes
provide the central themes of the arts advocacy discourse, arts educators risk abrogating
their primary responsibility to their students: rich and generative arts-centered inquiry.
As Bennett Reimer argues, in arts-centered inquiry students explore materials
(including sound) to probe the full range of human expressiveness and gain knowledge
of, in contrast to other cognitive areas which rely on symbols to communicate knowledge
about.251 Reimer points out that whereas conceptualization yields meanings of an
informational nature, communicated through abstract signs and symbols in discursive
form, aesthetic perceptual structuring – Reimer’s preferred term for the artistic process –
reveals meaning that is immanent and concrete, shared through presentational, not
discursive, form. In Reimer’s view, “Philosophy strives to get below all the many reasons
that might be given for the importance of a subject to that reason underlying them all –
that essential, singular, unifying concept that identifies the subject as being both unique
and necessary.”252 In the next section, I will examine the text from the Partnership for
21st Century Skills Map for the Arts, probing the definitions and outcomes to interrogate
the underlying philosophical assumption that creativity and innovation are commodities
that can be traded across domains.
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Limiting the Defining Qualities of the Arts to Skills
The P21 Framework defines the skills associated with critical thinking and
problem solving as asking significant questions, synthesizing information, and making
complex choices. When understood as interdependent parts of a recursive and reflective
process yielding provisional answers, they represent skills for inquiry. It would be a
reasonable expectation that a skills map for the arts would be arts-centered, with students
learning how to inquire into problems within artistic structures and traditions.
Eisner describes inquiry that is centered in the arts in terms of getting a feel for
the process of art: learning what it means to transform ideas and feelings into an art form
and as a consequence of working within the artistic process, learning how to recognize
excellence.253 Experience working within music, visual arts, dance, drama, film, or
another art form has pragmatically instrumental consequences for students as lifelong
inquirers. As Eisner argues, students come alive to aesthetic qualities in art and in life,
using an aesthetic frame of reference to see and hear and move; they understand art in the
context of time and place and grapple with the problems and possibilities cultural context
presents; and they develop a willingness to imagine possibilities, explore ambiguity, and
recognize multiple perspectives.254 Eisner calls these dispositions first-tier outcomes
since they are essential and fundamental to making art. I view them through a Deweyan
lens as pragmatically instrumental consequences inseparable from the arts-centered
inquiry from which they arise.
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The sample art activities listed in the P21 category “Critical Thinking and
Problem Solving,” however, do not reflect an arts-centered pragmatist approach to
inquiry. Instead, the examples emphasize verbal skills, with suggestions that students
disseminate the solutions to problems by means of blogs, wikis, and electronic
journals.255 By way of contrast, the activities developed for the category
“Communication” do focus on multiple ways meaning is communicated through artistic
media, reflecting an interpretation of the word “communication” that goes beyond the
narrow definition provided in the left sidebar of the document: “Articulating thoughts and
ideas clearly and effectively through speaking and writing.”256
Restricting the definition of “communication” to speaking and writing illustrates
the contradictions and limited scope inherent in how the Partnership for 21st Century
Skills conceptualizes what happens in arts-centered inquiry. The skill area entitled,
“Media Literacy” provides a case in point. Although the topic of media literacy is beyond
the scope of this dissertation, I argue that the way the P21 document defines media
literacy as understanding how messages (rather than meanings) are constructed and
interpreted frames the arts in terms of the emotional responses they can engender.
Moreover, to limit the arts to their usefulness in teaching students to communicate
verbally flies in the face of deeper questions pertaining to how individuals living
connected lives mediate those connections in mutually enriching ways.
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Eisner attempts to “dispel the idea that the arts are somehow intellectually
undemanding, emotive rather than reflective operations done with the hand somehow
unattached to the head.”257 In The Arts and the Creation of Mind, Eisner examines the
question of representation, that is, the process by which students show evidence of
cognition. He points out that the forms of representation emphasized in schools have a
direct bearing on “the kinds of mental skills and modes of thinking that students have an
opportunity to develop.”258 Eisner argues that it logically follows that local policy
decisions regarding curriculum influence how the children in that district or
neighborhood school think, musing that “the school’s curriculum can be considered a
mind-altering device.”259
The same reasoning applies to the decision-making process used to design the P21
curricular framework. Showing teachers and students ways to employ the tools of
technology to talk about the arts is potentially an engaging strategy for selling school
districts technology, but it hardly merits the time and energy necessary to develop a
curricular map. If, instead, educators and business leaders were to acknowledge the arts
for the complex kinds of thinking that students who are engaged in arts-centered inquiry
demonstrate, then the conversation about how to support and value such inquiry in
schools could begin. For example, Eisner associates complex thinking with perception of
subtle relationships and adds that even preschoolers demonstrate long periods of
engrossment when they are involved in producing art work. Students also show cognitive
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flexibility in their improvisatory responses when they participate in music, drama, and
dance. Anticipating the research of Harvard’s Project Zero,260 Eisner notes that “the kind
of flexible purposing fostered in the arts might develop forms of thinking and attitudes
toward problems that emerge in other fields” but at the same time cautions that “such
outcomes are never the arts’ primary educational justification.”261
John Dewey reached a similar conclusion that the curriculum determines the
kinds of thinking that takes place in schools. Criticizing those who would privilege the
intelligence exercised in the use of language and mathematics over the kinds of thinking
demonstrated in artistic production, Dewey writes:
Any idea that ignores the necessary rôle of intelligence in production of
works of art is based upon identification of thinking with use of one special
kind of material, verbal signs and words. To think effectively in terms of
relations of qualities is as severe a demand upon thought as to think in terms
of symbols, verbal and mathematical.262
Dewey emphasizes making sense of the whole situation, that is, apprehending meaning in
“relations of qualities.” The arts skills map, by contrast, largely focuses on discrete work
habits, presumably important for success in twenty-first century work settings. For
example, collaboration is defined in terms of flexibility and a willingness to be helpful
and compromise, while information, media, and technology literacy involves knowing
how to access and manage information efficiently within ethical and legal boundaries.
Meeting standards for delivering high-quality work on deadline is also a workforce skill

260

See Hetland et al., Studio Thinking, op. cit.

261

Eisner, The Arts and the Creation of Mind, 78-79.

262

Dewey, Art as Experience, 46.

82
that the Partnership for 21st Century Skills claims the arts can develop.263 In the final
section of this chapter I summarize how creativity and innovation are conceptualized in
the arts skills map and call into question the wisdom of professional arts associations for
supporting the document as an advocacy strategy in light of its embedded philosophical
ironies and contradictions.

Arts Advocacy and the Trope of Creativity and Innovation
The Partnership for 21st Century Skills Map for the Arts defines creativity as
demonstrating originality and inventiveness in work. In the same framework, innovation
is defined as “acting on creative ideas to make a tangible and useful contribution to the
domain in which innovation occurs.”264 The inclusion of the sections on creativity and
innovation in the P21 Skills Map has ironic implications. First, their inclusion is
unnecessary. Based on the sample activities offered by the arts educators invited to
collaborate on the project, creativity in the arts is arts-centered inquiry. It is what the arts
do. For example, consider the sample eighth-grade activity of creating an original piece
of choreography as a performance task that demonstrates creativity: Students “identify a
topic, research, explore options, select and develop ideas, get feedback, revise, refine,
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perform.”265 Similarly, the fourth-grade example describes the process of producing
multiple sketches in the working out of a painting and the twelfth-grade example
describes the playwriting process from initial script to final submission. If the Partnership
for 21st Century Skills is seeking effective ways to infuse more creativity into schools,
the pragmatically instrumental course of action would be to ensure that all students
engage in substantive arts-centered inquiry over the course of several years.
The second philosophical irony is that whereas the P21 Skills Map for the Arts
defines innovation in terms of tangible and useful contributions, K-12 students learn and
develop in mysterious and idiosyncratic ways.266 Engagement with the arts very often has
consequences for students that are intangible, yet powerfully instrumental to their growth.
Learning activities in which students use technology to manipulate sound, text, and
graphics to produce novel artifacts may be innovative, but they are not necessarily
educative.267 As Dewey reminds us, “The belief that all genuine education comes about
through experience does not mean that all experiences are genuinely or equally educative.
… Hence the central problem of an education based upon experience is to select the kind
of present experiences that live fruitfully and creatively in subsequent experiences.”268
During my years as an elementary school music educator, I took care to plan arts
experiences for my students that would live on fruitfully in their subsequent learning. I
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could neither orchestrate nor predict the ways those experiences would play out in the
lives of my students, so I remain skeptical of twenty-first century frameworks that seek to
impose rationality on every aspect of the learning process. In arguing for a reimagination
of arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism, I am urging arts educators,
researchers, policymakers, and advocates to design, study, ensure, and support deep and
generative arts learning for every K-12 student. In defining instrumental benefits of the
arts in terms of expanded learning possibilities for individual students, I focus on where
arts-centered inquiry can take students in their understandings within the arts and beyond.
In short, arts education happens in the arts for students. It is up to students – not
education-business partnerships – to decide where they go next with what they learn.
A research team from Project Zero at Harvard University’s Graduate School of
Education recently asked the question, “How do arts educators in the United States
conceive of and define high-quality arts learning?” After extensive interviews, site visits,
and literature reviews, the researchers concluded that
it is time to expand beyond the legislative perspective on quality, in which
the primary focus is on policies that create the conditions for high quality
arts programs, and instead embrace an experience perspective, in which the
primary focus in on the nature of the learning experiences for students. This
shift of focus prioritizes students’ learning as the heart of the matter – the
compass and measure of every arts learning experience.269
To advocate for arts education means to advocate for students. In Chapter 4, I will
discuss implications of the current analysis and suggest possibilities for further study.
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CHAPTER 4
REACHING TOWARD THE HORIZON
This dissertation argued for a reconstruction of the term “instrumental” to
encompass the generative possibilities for student growth inherent in arts-centered
inquiry. It presented a conceptual analysis of philosophical tensions evident within the
arts education advocacy discourse and offered an alternative way to warrant the claim
that the arts belong in schools. My work was largely informed by philosophers of
education who, in my judgment, consistently demonstrate a sophisticated understanding
of how students make meaning when immersed in arts-centered inquiry.
Although the pedagogical justifications for arts in schools take up positions along
a conceptual continuum stretching between stand-alone arts instruction at one end and
seamlessly integrated curriculum-based arts encounters at the other end, the philosophers
associated with those positions in the educational research literature tend to ask the larger
question of whether evidence supports the central claim that the arts provide individuals
and societies with value. My argument for an enlarged view of arts-centered inquiry as
pragmatic instrumentalism, for example, was informed by the writings of Maxine Greene,
who sees the value of aesthetics education residing precisely in the unpredictable ways
arts experiences broaden a particular student’s sense of life’s possibilities. She writes:
We who are teachers, authentically committed to enabling the young to
become, know what this means and how hard this is to attain. In aesthetic
education, classes can open the way to what seems secret or hidden. They
can appeal to each person’s sense of what might be, perhaps ought to be, as
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one reaches toward the horizon.270
David Granger’s interpretation of Dewey’s writings similarly lends support to my idea
that taking an organic and unified approach to arts-centered inquiry in schools “actively
gestures toward the possible.”271
Bennett Reimer also adopts an expansive perspective on aesthetics education. In
the Preface to the third edition of A Philosophy of Music Education, Reimer acknowledges “rebalances in emphases among various dimensions of the aesthetic enterprise.”272
While he defends his leadership role in formulating the National Standards for Arts
Education as a strategy for garnering legitimacy for arts education,273 Reimer has moved
toward what he describes as a synergistic philosophical stance, one in which musical
experience plays a major role.274 He explains that musical experience
includes aspects of form, practice, and social agency, is bounded in a particular way, and inevitably serves some functional purposes. An experiencebased philosophy of music education, I propose, allows for, honors, and
cultivates a broad array of characteristics particular to music and the ways
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people engage themselves with it, while also recognizing how such engagements can musically incorporate and transform many dimensions of life and
culture. An experience-based philosophy, I believe, can be inclusive yet
distinctively musical.275
It is the “distinctively musical” stipulation that keeps Reimer’s philosophy from
embracing expansiveness at the expense of coherence. I have adopted similar kinds of
parameters in limiting the research studies I examined to those in which students engage
in arts-centered inquiry, that is, school-based experiences in which individuals transform
materials into musical, visual, and dramatic media to make meaning.
Reimer further clarifies his pluralistic philosophical approach in a way that recalls
Dewey’s idea of generous thinking when he writes:
The mistake is to assume [the Western classical tradition] is sufficient. It is
not, because each music in the world, including the many musics within the
Western world, creates its own lived-in space of feeling, and each of those
feeling-habitats allows us to experience the world through its body of accomplishments. Creating music within a style requires feeling out the ways of
making meaning in that style, making meaning in the tradition, belief-system,
constraints, and generative possibilities each style operates within, each style’s
world of possible encounters with feeling. One must put oneself in the shoes
of a style to create within it. Doing so is a powerful way to think, feel, and act
“inside” the style.276
Reimer’s stylistic constraints parallel the research parameters I have placed on this
dissertation, and his proposition that creative inquiry yields generative possibilities for
meaning-making aligns with my reimagining of arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic
instrumentalism.
Another philosopher of music education who informed my work is Estelle
Jorgensen. The distinction she draws between music’s instrumental value in developing

275

Reimer, A Philosophy of Music Education, 3rd ed., 39.

276

Ibid., 130.

88
individual agency and the structural use of music to manipulate people for political,
social, religious, psychological, educational, or economic ends helped me clarify my own
conceptualization of instrumentalism.277 Facets of Jorgensen’s philosophical approach are
Deweyan, as when she acknowledges the centrality of student-teacher interaction to
knowledge construction and defines experience (italics in original) “in the deep sense of a
profound impact on the person, one that is practical and relevant to the needs and
interests of student, teacher, and public alike; perceived as significant by the individual
undergoing it; and vividly remembered by him or her.”278 Following Jorgensen, I
acknowledge that balancing individual and societal needs is a time-consuming process,
one which she accurately describes as “messy, sometimes difficult, and even painful.”279
To successfully communicate that imagining meaningful alternatives lies at the heart of
arts-centered inquiry will offer ongoing challenges – along with generative possibilities –
for any future work in arts education advocacy.

An Inquiry into Inquiry
To question philosophical assumptions implicit in various justifications for arts
education risks undoing arguments that currently provide students with access to the arts
in schools. I gained insight into this dilemma from Harry Broudy, who challenges those
who consider musical enjoyment the sole standard of value to explain why then music
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education is at all necessary. In response to his own challenge, Broudy looks to classical
Realism, with its foundational premise that human nature strives for perfection, to ground
his philosophy of music education. Yet Broudy also understands that the school program
“is fashioned as a rough compromise among the diverse values of life” and that “the
place music may achieve in a specific curriculum often depends more on the relations of
music to other areas of value and life than on aesthetic considerations.”280 Music
educators can teach a work’s form, Broudy argues, but it takes “a growing and deepening
experience” to understand the music’s significance.281
Broudy’s solution to negotiating the complexities surrounding having multiple
values in schools is to provide rational guidance in the selection of materials that lead the
learner into deeper levels of discrimination. As for the life experience needed to grasp
music’s meaning, Broudy advises music educators to “lead each individual to the gate,
open it as wide as musical training can, invite all to pass through it and, finally, hope that
life and general education will make a whole-hearted entry probable, if not inevitable.”282
In formulating his realistic philosophy of music education, Broudy acknowledges
Dewey’s idea that artistic form expresses the pushes and pulls of life,283 and Deweyan
influences are evident when Broudy makes the key concept of his music education
program growth in musical understanding within the continuity of the musical
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tradition.284 Broudy and Reimer both have guided my work as I reimagine generative
consequences of arts-centered inquiry while still honoring the qualities that delineate arts
experiences within a particular tradition.
Over the years, arts education advocates have reduced competing claims
justifying the place of the arts in schools to an argument of intrinsic value versus extrinsic
value, with the term “instrumental” often substituted for “extrinsic.” I learned to question
this line of reasoning from reading Monroe Beardsley, who shows how the sedimentation
of commonly-held assumptions surrounding the terms “intrinsic” and “instrumental” has
led to use of the terms in opposition to each other.285 Acknowledging that he is taking up
Dewey’s attack on the concept of intrinsic value, Beardsley argues that intrinsic and
extrinsic are not coordinate species but rather relational in the sense that some extrinsic
value will derive from its serving as a means to good. Thus, instrumental value is
conferred upon an art work or arts experience such that it becomes an instrument of
value.286 Moreover, Beardsley continues, the rational justification for conferring value is
a matter of empirical confirmation, without any previous consideration of intrinsic
value.287
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Beardsley cautions that instrumentality in the arts is provisionally valuable insofar
as the experience itself connects to something we value.288 I argued, therefore, that the
phrase “art for art’s sake” rings hollow unless students have opportunities to engage with
the arts in ways that enable them, as Maxine Greene writes, “to notice what is there to be
noticed, and to lend works of art their lives in such a way that they can achieve them as
variously meaningful. When this happens, new connections are made in experience: new
patterns are formed, new vistas are opened.”289 I maintain that arts-centered inquiry,
though not sufficient for carrying out the entire instrumental work of a comprehensive
curriculum, nevertheless contributes to fostering growth and continuity within it. As
Beardsley so convincingly argues, Dewey’s rejection of the notion of intrinsic value has
important social and ethical implications since it underscores Dewey’s commitment to
connecting values with human needs.290
Because my argument is grounded in conceptualizing arts-centered inquiry as a
human value meeting a human need, the work of James Garrison provided guidance,
particularly in clarifying how I examined and judged the soundness of scholarly
arguments that critique advocacy claims. As an inquiry into inquiry, I began this study by
adopting Garrison’s definition of inquiry as “the creative activity of transforming needful
situations into more desirable circumstances.”291 According to Garrison, inquiry is as
much a moral task as an aesthetic adventure because imagining possibilities that expand
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freedom requires practical wisdom and practical reasoning to ensure that consequences of
action are morally desirable, not merely desired.292
I applied Garrison’s interpretation of Dewey’s “transactional realism” to learning
transactions within the context of school-based arts programs. Viewing arts education as
arts-centered inquiry means “understanding what a technique is good for – indeed,
whether it is genuinely good at all.”293 Inquiry is an instrument that, according to
Garrison, “artistically mediates between the actual and the possible, just as it cognitively
mediates between ignorance and knowledge.”294 In this dissertation I sought to illuminate
possibilities for advancing arts education advocacy discussions by pragmatically
conceiving consequences for student learning that are not final but rather generative to
subsequent learning. I urged all participants in the advocacy discourse to consider the
negative consequences for students if we as a nation continue to employ interventions
designed to boost achievement outcomes or spark innovation without attending to the
nurturing of deep structural understandings on which individual creativity depends.

Educational Implications
In The Quest for Certainty, Dewey argues that the traits of objects and events we
experience are effects, not causes, and that what knowledge concerns itself with is our
ability to judge initiating actions that direct some phase of connected changes toward a
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stable, albeit contingent, result.295 Related to Dewey’s reconnection of knowledge with
action is his attempt to eliminate the divide – persisting since ancient Greece – separating
the lofty “pure activity” of the ideal and eternal from the inferior practical arts. Dewey
wants to extend the meaning of “practical” to all activities that enhance human
relationships and make life more secure, including the fine arts, education, and ethical
conduct.296 Reimagining arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism offers an
intelligent alternative to ossified ways of thinking about the arts. To support my argument
that a more expansive approach to arts advocacy is needed, I examined pertinent
advocacy materials, accessible online, scholarly critiques of arts advocacy claims, and
research evaluations of school-based arts programs. My work was informed by
experiences gained over fifteen years as an arts educator in a large urban school district.
Now serving as a school counselor, I wonder at the complexity of K-12 public schools
and agree with Dewey that what happens at the intersection of the necessary and the
spontaneous, in the space where reciprocally productive and receptive dimensions of
human experience become infused with immanent meaning, is art.297
Dewey argues that inquiry serves the instrumental function of “connecting
principles which link different phenomena together” in order to artfully enrich
understanding for practice.298 It is from this pragmatic stance that I envision arts-centered
inquiry as instrumental to enhancing student growth. Such a reimagining of arts
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education is important because it seeks to draw a distinction between utilitarian
justifications for the arts and instrumental conceptualizations of the role of the arts in
mediating complex and connected learning in schools. The pervasiveness of “creativity
and innovation” as a theme within the advocacy discourse impelled the conceptual
analysis that anchors this study. I offer it as a means to promote greater understanding
among practitioners, researchers, policymakers, and advocates.
Samuel Hope argues that creativity is a complex of knowledge and skills that
work together over a long span of time. For Hope, creativity is mysterious and must be
approached with care and wisdom. He associates creativity with bodies of content, albeit
in multiple combinations of “fields of endeavor, disciplines, professions, sets of
sensibilities.”299 With constant practice, students are able to become more fluent and
sophisticated in using various languages and frameworks, and the greater their fluency in
a discipline or medium, according to Hope, the greater their capability to think things up
for the benefit of others.300
Hope cautions arts educators and researchers to be alert to the use of terms like
“creativity” and “innovation” as “rhetorical or conceptual substitutes for the arts.”301 He
points out that educational practice in the United States “has a tendency to express deep
yearnings for accomplishments such as creativity, while at the same time encouraging
attitudes, setting policies, and promulgating systems that make such accomplishments all
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but impossible.”302 Hope also advises practitioners in the field of arts education to be
attentive to the misuse of research findings to support advocacy claims linking creativity
development with the arts.303
Enid Zimmerman similarly urges the arts education community to be mindful of
the consequences an over-zealous embrace of creativity might entail, calling particular
attention to the Partnership for 21st Century Skills.304 She wants arts educators to be
aware of “political, economic, and socio-cultural agendas to reconceptualize creative
practice and concurrently satisfy educational goals.”305 I agree with Hope and
Zimmerman, adding that individuals working in arts education have the responsibility to
articulate in words the instrumental value of the arts for students and to present evidence
to support those claims in the myriad ways that growth in the arts can be represented. To
advocate for arts education requires a philosophical foundation that focuses on generative
possibilities for student learning in the arts. I offer a Deweyan approach that reimagines
arts-centered inquiry as pragmatic instrumentalism to provide that philosophical
grounding.
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Concluding Thoughts
To make art is to conceive consequences in terms of one’s own instrumentality in
creating and responding to those conceptions, and then act in light of that imagining. This
is pragmatic instrumentalism. Experiencing art made by another is similarly transactional.
Both artist and percipient are engaged in arts-centered inquiry, which for the purposes of
this study I defined as school-based experiences in which individuals seek understanding
by entering into meaning-making transactions that transform materials into musical,
visual, and dramatic media.
In arguing for a reconsideration of pragmatic instrumentalism as a way to reimagine arts-centered inquiry, I continued in Dewey’s efforts to eliminate the divide
separating the lofty “pure activity” of the ideal and eternal from the inferior practical arts,
addressing philosophical tensions, ironies, and contradictions underlying current arts
advocacy debates. Dewey writes:
In reaction against the age-long depreciation of practice in behalf of contemplative knowledge, there is a temptation simply to turn things upside down.
But the essence of pragmatic instrumentalism is to conceive of both knowledge and practice as means of making goods – excellences of all kinds –
secure in experienced existence.306
Given that in adopting a pragmatist approach to inquiry, provisional conclusions
continually become instruments of new inquiries, reimagining arts-centered inquiry as
pragmatic instrumentalism affirms the generative possibilities of the arts. Any attempt to
force the arts into a framework of twenty-first century skills begs the question, “Does arts
education develop creativity?” In other words, designing skill maps for the arts assumes
rather than demonstrates precisely the point in contention, namely, that arts education is a
306
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useful vehicle for producing creative workers for the nation. Moreover, the trope of
creativity and innovation embedded in the arts education advocacy discourse gives voice
to – “advocates for” – a dualistic conceptualization that separates pure and final
“Creativity” from practical and product-driven “innovation.” This study offers an
alternative way to conceptualize arts-centered inquiry. I urge arts educators, researchers,
policymakers, and advocates to pragmatically provide warrant for the instrumental value
of the arts in schools by connecting the complex meanings mediated in arts-centered
inquiry to their generative consequences for student learning.
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